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Climate change will inevitably lead some companies to default on their debt, putting 
stress on banks and financial institutions. To ensure financial stability, financial institutions must 
prepare for climate risk appropriately. Although the first step to mitigating climate risk is 
quantifying that risk, researchers have not come to a consensus on the magnitude of climate-
related credit risk. This thesis builds on prior research by taking a bottom-up approach to 
modeling climate risk in the American financial system. I find that risk is concentrated in certain 
companies, industries, regions, and financial institutions. Although these findings do not provide 
evidence that there is systematic climate risk in the American financial system, they do indicate 
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Climate change poses a severe threat to ecosystems, cities, and economies. In certain 
areas, extreme weather events like tropical cyclones, droughts, and heatwaves have already 
become stronger and more prevalent than they were previously due to climate change (Bouwer, 
2018). Between 1988 and 2017, the average number of natural catastrophes per year rose 26%, 
and the cost of those catastrophes rose by 35.7% (Munich Re, 2019). Scientists expect the effects 
of climate change to worsen in the future. Jevrejeva et al.et al. (2018) found that the damage 
caused by climate change-induced flooding could slow global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth by 2.8% per year by 2100. The United States (U.S.) is not immune from economic 
climate risk: for each 1°C increase in global temperature, Hsiang et al. (2017) predicts the U.S.’ 
GDP growth will shrink by 1.2%. Therefore, climate change is a serious risk to economic 
productivity in the U.S. 
Climate-based economic risk could lead to financial instability. The Governor of the 
Bank of England, Mark Carney, noted in his seminal 2015 address that “Climate change will 
threaten financial resilience and longer-term prosperity” (Carney, 2015, p. 16), creating risk for 
financial institutions. Most of this risk will either stem from climate change’s physical threats to 
operations or from phasing out greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Because financial institutions 
typically do not have expansive physical operations and do not emit large quantities of GHGs, 
their exposure to climate risk stems from their investment portfolios. Financial institutions invest 
in portfolio companies with varying degrees of climate exposure, primarily through debt 
products. If enough of those debt investments were to go into default, financial institutions would 




widespread default on bank loans is the most likely way that climate change will threaten 
financial stability, as shown in Figure 1. 
For climate risk to threaten financial institutions, climate risk must materially threaten 
portfolio companies, and portfolio companies must fail to mitigate this risk themselves. Even if 
portfolio companies fail to mitigate climate risk, lending to companies with high exposure to 
climate risk is only problematic if financial institutions do not appropriately account for the 
riskiness of their investments. Financial institutions lend to companies with very high levels of 
existing debt (highly leveraged companies), which are more likely to go into default than 
companies with lower levels of debt. However, financial institutions understand that lending to 
highly levered companies is risky and account for that risk by making fewer loans and holding 
more capital in reserve against those loans, so there is no systematic issue. Climate risk may pose 
a threat to financial stability if regulators fail to impose restrictions on financial institutions’ 
climate risk exposures and financial institutions fail to address this risk independently.  
In this introduction, I describe how the current financial system is vulnerable to climate-
induced financial instability or fragility. I outline the climate risks facing portfolio companies, 
those companies’ failure to mitigate climate risks, the lack of federal regulatory oversight on 





Figure 1  
Pathway from Climate Change to Financial Risk 
 
Note. Risk for financial institutions comes from their portfolio companies. If portfolio companies 
default on their debt, financial institutions will suffer losses and will not be able to provide 
capital markets with liquidity. This failure could result in financial instability. 
1.1 Generic Climate Risks 
The first step in determining whether climate change creates the potential for financial 
instability is determining whether it poses material financial risks to financial institutions’ 
portfolio companies. Climate change poses two types of generic risk to corporations and the 




climate change on ecosystems and environments, whereas transition risk is risk to corporations 
or the broader economy that is created by humans’ attempts to mitigate physical risks. 
1.1.1 Physical Risk 
Although the physical impacts of climate change on ecosystems and environments will be 
wide-reaching and varied (Carleton & Hsiang, 2016), the impact of natural disasters, lowered 
labor productivity, and lowered agricultural productivity on overall economic productivity are 
the most well researched (e.g., TCFD, 2017; U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
2020). 
As the climate changes, natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires, and heatwaves 
become more severe. In their wake, these events create economic destruction that poses a risk to 
corporations. In 2017, Hurricane Harvey caused roughly $90Bn of damage, $67Bn of which 
Frame et al. (2020) attribute to climate change. Abatzoglou and Williams (2016) found that 
climate change is increasing aridity in the Western U.S., doubling the area susceptible to 
wildfires, a trend that will continue. Fifteen of the 20 worst wildfires in California’s history have 
occurred since the year 2000, and 10 of those have been since 2015 (Governor Newsom’s Strike 
Force, 2019). Dinan (2017) projects that the average yearly damage from hurricanes will 
increase from $28Bn in 2015 to $63Bn by 2075. 
Lower labor productivity is another type of material physical risk. Zhang et al. (2018) 
found that higher temperatures lead to lower labor productivity in both physically and mentally 
intensive work and predict that unabetted temperature rise could shrink China’s GDP by 12.8% 
by 2100. Given that temperatures have risen more quickly in the U.S. than in the rest of the 




Therefore, portfolio companies are exposed to physical risk through lower workforce 
productivity. 
The final well-research physical risk to portfolio companies is lowered agricultural 
productivity. As climates change, places where crops currently grow will degrade until they are 
no longer arable. Hsiang et al. (2017) forecast a 9.1% decrease in crop yields for each degree 
Celsius of global temperature rise in the U.S. Because basic agricultural commodities are inputs 
for many other sectors, decreased agricultural productivity will have widespread ramifications 
outside of the agricultural sector. Increases in agricultural commodity prices will likely hurt all 
sectors that rely on agricultural products. 
In sum, the costs of increasingly severe and frequent natural disasters, lowered labor 
productivity, and lowered agricultural productivity caused by climate change create physical risk 
for corporations. These risks could result in lower operating profit margins and large one-time 
losses, which might cause portfolio companies to go into default. However, not only do portfolio 
companies face physical risks from climate change but also transition risks stemming from 
actions taken with the goal of decreasing the physical effects of climate change. 
1.1.2 Transition Risk 
Transition risks stem from attempts to mitigate physical risk. The first and most 
significant type of transition risk comes from government regulation of GHG emissions. 
Regulations can include carbon taxes, clean energy subsidies, or a combination of the two (Chen 
& Hu, 2018). The two most popular types of carbon tax are cap and trade, in which companies 
receive a carbon allocation they can sell on the open market, and a simple tax on emissions. 
Sixty-two different jurisdictions, including California, British Columbia, and the European 




regulations only apply to certain industries and under-tax carbon relative to its true cost 
(Skovgaard et al., 2019). However, even with underpriced carbon regulation systems, emission 
regulation can be costly for portfolio companies. For example, although California’s cap-and-
trade system only applies to 450 large electric power plants, industrial plants, and fuel 
distributors, it has charged companies $12.5Bn in taxes since 2013, which equates to roughly 
$28.8MM per firm (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2021). 
Another prominent form of transition risk comes from technology stranding assets. 
Assets become stranded when decreases in demand for a product render the assets used to 
produce that product worthless. In the case of climate change, a large shift in the relative prices 
of fossil fuels and renewable energy could make fossil fuel production economically non-viable 
and strand associated assets. For example, if there were a drastic decrease in the cost of storing 
energy that caused renewable energy to become cheaper than fossil fuels, oil extraction assets 
would become worthless. Lithium-ion batteries are used to store renewable energy, and their cost 
is a large preventative factor from more widespread adoption of renewable energy. The price of 
lithium-ion batteries fell by 80% between 2010 and 2017, and prices will likely continue to fall, 
creating a serious risk for fossil fuel producers (Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2019). In 
fact, Linquiti and Cogswell (2016) find that if fossil fuels were to become significantly more 
expensive relative to renewables, the value of fossil fuel reserves would drop 63%, or $185 
trillion. Therefore, stranded assets due to technological advancements create an important form 
of transition risk. 
One other less prominent but noteworthy form of transition risk is legal risk. As 
environmental groups work to control industrial contributions to emissions, they will seek to 




Baltimore is currently suing fossil fuel companies, including BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell, 
because the companies knew their products would lead to climate change and continued to sell 
them (Hersher et al., 2021). According to the Sabin Center at Columbia University Law School 
(2020), at least 1,561 climate related lawsuits have been filed in the U.S., demonstrating the scale 
of future liabilities companies may face from high emissions. Government organizations have 
been slow to define the limits of companies’ liability for climate-related harms that they cause, 
which increases the risk of facing litigation. 
Regardless of whether the global community takes action to mitigate the physical risks 
described above (and in the process creates transition risk), corporations will face losses due to 
climate change. Additionally, since physical risk affects real capital, those with large physical 
operations are likely to face more physical risk than those with less expansive operations. 
Similarly, since transition risk results from attempts to mitigate physical risk (accomplished by 
decreasing GHG emissions), those that emit high levels of GHGs are more likely to face 
transition risk than other companies. Therefore, the companies to which financial institutions 
lend face material climate risk. It will only be by effectively mitigating these risks that financial 
institutions will avoid instability. 
1.2 Portfolio Companies’ Responses to Risk 
If portfolio companies mitigate risk appropriately and financial markets price risk 
efficiently, financial institutions’ exposure to climate risk should not lead to financial instability. 
If portfolio companies are able to protect themselves against climate risk, climate change will not 
cause them to default on their debt. Similarly, if financial markets price loans fairly, financial 




planning at the portfolio company level and the market’s mispricing of assets creates potential 
climate risk for financial institutions. 
Portfolio companies do not appear to be preparing adequately for climate change, 
meaning that climate change could cause those companies to default on their debt. Of the 
corporations that disclosed their climate risk mitigation practices to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project in 2016, only 46% reported dedicating any additional funds to addressing risks associated 
with climate change (Goldstein et al., 2018). Only 3.3% of companies in industries that rely on 
natural resources such as rivers or farmland had taken action to preserve those assets. 
Furthermore, whereas the scientific consensus projects losses to be on the scale of trillions of 
dollars, companies have only been planning for stranded assets on the scale of billions of dollars 
(Goldstein et al., 2018). Taken together, it appears that corporations are not taking sufficient 
action to address risks associated with climate change, and climate change could devalue the 
investment vehicles that rely on those companies. However, if the government regulates financial 
institutions’ exposure to investment vehicles with high climate risk, it will eliminate systemic 
financial risk. 
1.3 Regulation of Financial Risk 
Stress testing in the U.S. has largely been defined by standards set by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and enhanced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2019; 
H.R.4173 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010). Founded in 
1974 to standardize global financial institution regulation, the BCBS is best known for its capital 
adequacy regulation guidelines, the Basel I, II, and III. The first iteration of those guidelines was 




are not binding (each nation’s central bank or appropriate authority must issue their own 
directives), all 45 member institutions agree to implement them (The Bank of International 
Settlements, n.d.). 
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review is currently a scenario-based exercise, 
or “stress test,” that tests the ability of American bank holding companies with consolidated 
assets of over $100MM to withstand adverse economic conditions. Financial institutions with 
between $100MM and $250MM in assets must complete the exercise biannually, and financial 
institutions with over $250MM in assets must complete the exercise annually. The stress test 
includes both a quantitative and a qualitative exercise. If a financial institution fails either 
exercise, it cannot distribute capital to its shareholders via stock buybacks or dividends. The 
Federal Reserve can also issue a “conditional non-objection,” in which case the financial 
institution must make some changes to its capital planning before being able to distribute capital. 
In the quantitative exercise of the stress test, the Federal Reserve provides financial 
institutions a realistic baseline and hypothetical distressed economic scenario defined by 28 
variables, including six measures of economic activity, four measures of asset prices, six 
measures of interest rates, and three macroeconomic variables by country bloc for four different 
blocs (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2021a). The financial institutions 
must model how these variables will impact certain capital reserve ratios (i.e., what percentage 
of its assets are liquid and could be used to pay off depositors), as defined by the Basel III 
guidelines. To pass, a financial institution must project maintaining minimum capital reserve 
ratios both in the baseline and severely distressed scenarios. To project these ratios in the 
distressed scenario, financial institutions model changes in portfolio probabilities of default 




With the losses, the institutions can model their new balance sheet, and therefore their reserve 
ratios.  
The capital reserve ratios are defined by a measure of liquid capital (e.g., Common 
Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 Capital, etc.) divided by a measure of total assets (either risk weighted or 
unweighted). Essentially, these ratios measure what percentage of an institution’s loans could go 
into default without putting that institution into insolvency. The current CCAR relies on five 
capital reserve ratios: Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), tier 1 risk-based capital, total risk-based 
capital, tier 1 leverage, and Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2020). CET1, tier 1 risk-based capital, and total capital are classified as 
“Capital Ratios” and are different from the “Leverage Ratios” (i.e., SLR and tier 1 leverage ratio) 
in that they weigh riskier assets more heavily than leverage ratios. For example, a mortgage may 
be weighted 100%, whereas a Treasury Bond may not count at all. However, even for the Capital 
Ratios, risk weightings are solely based on measures of financial risk and no other forms of risk 
such as climate risk.  
The qualitative exercise assesses the adequacy of the underlying analyses and processes 
that are used in the quantitative portion of the stress test. It measures the adequacy of six areas of 
capital planning: governance, risk management, internal controls, capital policy, scenario design, 
and projection methodology. Typically, the Federal Reserve will not issue an objection unless an 
institution’s capital planning is inadequate in multiple categories. However, after an institution 
has been subject to the qualitative assessment for four years and passes in the fourth year, it is no 
longer required to complete the qualitative portion of the assessment. Because of this rule, the 
exercise for 2020 was the last for which any financial institution could receive objections on 




institutions’ exposures to financial risk includes monitoring their exposure to climate risk. 
Although it is possible that capital reserve ratios set under the current system are large enough to 
also account for climate risk, this is not clear and warrants further investigation. If it turns out 
that these existing reserve ratios do not account for climate risk, climate change would create the 
potential for financial instability unless financial institutions moderate their own risk. 
1.4 Financial Institutions’ Responses to Risk 
If financial institutions were adequately moderating their exposure to climate risk, one 
would expect an inverse correlation between asset prices and climate risk. Because investors 
demand compensation for taking on risk, this inverse correlation would mean that financial 
institutions accurately view assets that are more vulnerable to climate change as riskier than 
average assets. Unfortunately, although asset prices are somewhat inversely correlated with 
climate risk (Bolton & Kacperczyk, 2020), they are not correlated to the degree one would 
expect given the severity of climate risk, meaning that the full risks of climate change are not 
priced in (Griffin et al., 2019; Hong et al., 2020). The market’s failure to efficiently price in 
climate risk may mean that financial institutions are inefficiently pricing climate risk, which 
would introduce systemic risk in the financial system.  
1.5 Summary 
Climate change poses material physical and transition risks to companies and the broader 
economy. Because companies are not fully mitigating climate risk, their securities also pose a 
climate risk to those who hold them. The government is not regulating the investments that 
financial institutions make in securities that pass climate risk on to their owners, and the financial 
institutions themselves may not be efficiently accounting for climate risk. This lack of risk 




To successfully address this potential for financial instability, governments and 
researchers must accurately calculate the magnitude of climate risk to which financial institutions 
are exposed. This thesis presents a model by which this could be accomplished. The paper 
proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the approaches that exist in the literature for measuring 
financial climate risk. Section 3 provides an overview of the datasets that I use and their 
manipulations for use in this thesis. It also covers the theoretical model that I use to calculate 








2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the possibility of significant climate risk in the financial system, regulators, 
multinational organizations, and academics have proposed principles for measuring the 
seriousness of this risk. Most existing literature focuses on a three-tiered, top-down approach to 
modeling risk with a climate scenario, macroeconomic model, and microeconomic model (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2020; Bingler & Senni, 2020; NGFS, 2020; Vermeulen et al., 2018), that is shown in 
Figure 2. In the top-down approach, the macroeconomic model takes inputs from the climate 
scenario to predict economic performance, and the microeconomic model translates the 
macroeconomic performance into implications for companies. Bottom-up approaches are also 
based on climate scenarios. However, they measure financial institution exposure on a loan-by-
loan basis and are becoming increasingly popular for their applications. If a regulator wants to 
model the direct impact of a policy on companies and not the general macroeconomic impact, a 
bottom-up approach is preferable to a top-down approach. To understand either approach, it is 
important to understand the climate scenarios on which the assessments are based. 
2.1 Climate Scenarios 
Climate scenarios define the real-world situations on which the financial climate risk 
assessment is based. Climate scenarios are typically based around a set of climate change 
mitigation goals and governments’ regulatory actions to reach those goals. The policies enacted 
to reach these goals define the transition risk that companies will face and influence the rate and 




 Common policy action scenarios are designed to avoid the most severe physical effects 
of climate change by limiting global temperature rise to 2°C (e.g., Allen et al., 2020; Eis & 
Schafer, 2019; NGFS, 2020; Vermeulen et al., 2018), meeting the nationally determined 
contributions defined in the Paris Climate Agreement (e.g., TCFD, 2017), or doing nothing (e.g., 
NGFS, 2020; Vermeulen et al. 2018). Most models (e.g., Allen et al., 2020; NGFS, 2020; TCFD, 
2017; Vermeulen et al., 2018) include scenarios in which the government implements policies to 
achieve these goals immediately (a shock) or by 2030 (a smooth transition). Most transition risk 
models focus primarily on regulatory action, but some focus on other transition risks such as 
technological obsolescence (e.g., Vermeulen et al., 2018). Although some scenario models are 
country specific (e.g., Allen et al., 2020; Vermeulen et al., 2018), others are international (e.g., 
Eis & Schafer, 2019; NGFS, 2020; TCFD, 2017). Different choices for goals, implementation 
timeline and scope can be useful in different scenarios, depending on the purpose of the research. 
Once these decisions are made, researchers can either apply those scenarios to the 
macroeconomy in a top-down approach or to individual companies in a bottom-up approach. 
2.2 Top-Down Approach 
The most popular approach to measuring financial climate risk has been top-down 
modeling. In the top-down approach, researchers model the impacts of climate change on the 
broader economy, then allocate that risk to individual firms, and finally measure how that risk 
will influence the probabilities that firms will default on their loans. Figure 2 illustrates this 
process. This approach, however, is not as accurate in modeling risks as a bottom-up approach 
because it must rely on a larger number of approximations than would a bottom-up approach. 
Instead of making one approximation to model risk at the firm level, it must first make an 




to firms. An example of a transition risk that can be cleanly modeled at the firm level is a carbon 
tax since the carbon tax impacts firms directly and individually, so if a government wanted to 
assess the impacts of a carbon tax, a bottom-up approach would be preferable. 
 
Figure 2  
Typical Financial Climate Risk Assessment Model: Top-Down Approach 
 
Note. Most financial climate risk assessment models follow this pattern. They begin with a 
climate model that produces climate scenarios. A macroeconomic model then uses the climate 




operational model then maps the economy’s performance to predicted company performance and 
probability of default. 
2.2.1 Macroeconomic Model 
After forming a climate scenario, the first step in a top-down approach is using climate 
scenarios as inputs for a macroeconomic model. However, typically, macroeconomic models 
only account for the physical (e.g., Woetzel et al., 2020) or transition risk (e.g., Allen et al., 
2020; Nguyen, 2021; Vermeulen et al., 2018) proposed by the climate scenario, but not both. 
This is because physical risk and transition risk are inversely correlated, but researchers have not 
definitively determined the nature of this relationship (Jones & Friedlinstein, 2020). Based on the 
conditions described by the climate scenario, researchers predict changes to certain 
macroeconomic variables such as labor productivity, commodity prices, or interest rates (e.g., 
Allen et al., 2020; Vermeulen et al., 2018). Researchers then use these variables as inputs for a 
macroeconomic model (typically an integrated assessment model or a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model) to project the scenario’s impact on the economy. This macroeconomic model 
then outputs how the scenario will impact economic growth and productivity, but not how the 
scenario will impact individual companies. 
One popular model that Allen et al. (2020) and Vermeulen et al. (2018) use is the 
National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM). NiGEM is a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model that includes between 80 and 200 economic variables (depending on the 
country the researcher is modeling) to predict global macroeconomic indicators such as GDP. 
Although NiGEM was not specifically designed for modeling climate change scenarios, 





After a macroeconomic model determines the large-scale impacts of climate change on 
the economy, an accompanying microeconomic model allocates those impacts to portfolio 
companies.  
2.2.2 Microeconomic Model 
To distribute macroeconomic risks to individual companies in the microeconomic model, 
researchers typically relate climate risk to company attributes (e.g., Allen et al., 2020; Vermeulen 
et al., 2018). Because increases in the price of GHG emissions typically drive transition risk, 
many researchers assume that the impact that transition risks will have on companies is 
associated with their emissions. If companies that emit more GHG account for a greater portion 
of the macroeconomic cost of climate change, the microeconomic model assigns to them more 
risk than those with less GHG emissions. Because there is no reliable data for GHG emissions at 
the firm level, researchers typically aggregate firms and distribute risk by industry. 
One popular form of distributing transition risk to companies in a microeconomic model, 
described by Vermeulen et al. (2018), is using a Transition Vulnerability Factor (TVF). A TVF 
measures the number of standard deviations separating an industry’s GHG emissions from the 
mean GHG emissions. A company’s TVF is essentially the z-score for the industry’s emissions 
and yields a proxy for the microeconomic impact of climate change when multiplied by the 
average economic impact of climate change across the wider economy. 
Researchers typically follow a similar pattern for estimating physical risk. A firm’s 
exposure to physical risk depends on its location, so the physical risk is generally determined 
locally. For example, a firm that has most of its operations in the Gulf of Mexico would face 
physical threats from hurricanes, but a firm operating in California would face threats from 




researchers focus on operational geography as opposed to industry to assess physical risk (e.g., 
Woetzel et al., 2020). 
After determining the operational economic impact of climate change on companies, the 
models translate the microeconomic operational risk to financial risk and predict probability of 
default at a company level. In summary, the bottom down approach arrives at financial 
institutions’ exposure level by creating climate scenarios, modeling the economic impacts of 
those scenarios, distributing those impacts to individual firms, and modeling the probability of 
default. These results provide insight into systematic financial exposure. However, the mapping 
of climate scenarios onto inputs to macroeconomic models (e.g., interest rates, labor force 
participation rates, etc.) requires approximations which can add error to models. 
2.3 Bottom-Up Approach 
Recently, researchers have begun to map the climate scenarios directly onto firms to 
avoid the error associated with mapping to macroeconomic variables and then firms. This 
approach is especially helpful for addressing the impact of targeted policies like carbon taxes.  
Reinders et al. (2020) apply a bottom-up approach to measure the market shock that 
implementing a carbon tax would cause. Specifically, they measure the Dutch financial system’s 
exposure to climate risk by using a discounted cash flow analysis to model financial institutions’ 
exposure to equity products with climate risk. They then employ Merton’s Model (1974) to 
measure financial institutions’ exposures to climate risk through debt products. 
2.3.1 Equity Exposure 
To measure the loss that financial institutions could suffer due a carbon tax decreasing 
equity market values, Reinders et al. (2020) used a discounted cash flow analysis. They equated 




on the assumption that equity value is the sum of the discounted cash flows that a company will 
generate, they calculated the loss that financial institutions would face in the equity market as the 
sum of the discounted carbon taxes.  
Although this approach is elegant in its simplicity, it fails to account for the firms’ 
responses to climate risk and priced-in investor expectations. If a carbon tax increases the cost of 
a firm’s production process, the firm might change the process to one that would have been more 
expensive than the current process without the carbon tax but is cheaper than the current process 
with the carbon tax. Switching processes would mean that the firm would only lose a percentage 
of the carbon tax in cash flows. Additionally, equity investors have already begun to price 
transition risk into equity prices as the probability of those adverse events occurring multiplied 
by the magnitude of those expected risks (Ilhan et al., 2020; Kolbel et al., 2020). Therefore, 
equity prices may increase by only a portion of a carbon tax equal to the difference between the 
expected liability and actual liability, times one minus the probability of a carbon tax occurring. 
2.3.2 Debt Exposure 
The most common method of analyzing financial institutions’ exposure to climate risk 
through debt products is treating the amount that a company will pay as a liability and evaluating 
how that liability will impact probability of default. Reinders et al. take this approach to measure 
risk in the Netherlands.  A popular way to measure probability of default is using Merton’s 
(1974) model for default, which is the model I use in this thesis and will describe in further detail 
in my methodology. Although Merton’s model is an effective method for measuring probability 
of default, it makes various assumptions (including that borrowers do not pay dividends, a 




that are not always true. Despite its drawbacks, treating a carbon tax as a liability is an effective 
way of measuring climate risk. 
In summary, the bottom-up approach can be used to model financial institutions’ 
exposures to both debt and equity products. Bottom-up approaches are preferable to top-down 
approaches for cases in which climate scenarios can easily be applied to individual firms because 
they avoid unnecessary approximations.  
2.4 Climate Risk Assessment Results 
Researchers have found evidence using both top-down and bottom-up financial climate 
risk assessments that European financial institutions have significant but manageable exposure to 
climate risk. Using a top-down approach, Allen et al. (2020) found that probabilities of default 
could increase by over 400% by 2040 in French industries such as petroleum production but by 
as little as 1.6% in the food service industry. Also using a top-down approach Vermeulen et al. 
(2018) found that regulatory ratios, a measure of how solvent financial institutions are, could 
decrease by 16% in Dutch financial institutions. Reinders et al. (2020) used a bottom-up 
approach and found that the available CET1 capital in the Netherlands could fall by 30%. 
However, reports that looked at the U.S., such as the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission report (2020) assessed risk systematically and not at the financial institution level. 
Researchers have largely shied away from assessing climate risk at the financial 
institution level in the U.S. because climate-related disclosures are incomplete. Nonetheless, 
such assessments would allow us to measure climate risk more accurately. Since the systemic 
risk could be distributed unevenly between financial institutions, researchers should examine 
financial institutions’ portfolios to ensure that no individual financial institutions are materially 




researchers have not come to a consensus on the magnitude of climate-related credit risk. This 
thesis builds on prior research by taking a bottom-up approach to modeling climate risk in the 







3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In this methodology, I first discuss the datasets that I used and the construction of the 
merged database that I used in my analysis. I then describe the theoretical steps that I take to 
measure exposure to climate risk among American Financial institutions. 
3.1 Data and Database Construction 
In this section, I describe the three datasets that I used and how I prepared those datasets 
for use in my methodology. 
3.1.1 Sources and Limitations 
The model in this thesis relies upon three types of data: greenhouse gas emissions data, 
financial institution loan data, and corporate financial data. The greenhouse gas emissions data 
came from the Carbon Disclosure Project’s 2019 Supply Chain report. The financial institution 
loan data comes from Thomson Reuters’ DealScan and the corporate financial data comes from 
CapitalIQ. Each data set makes unique contributions to the model and has specific limitations. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data 
All emissions-related data comes from Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) reports between 
2017 and 2019. The three reports together contain data on 5,950 companies’ sustainability goals 
and performance from 2015 to 2018. From the larger CDP dataset, I used self-reported data from 
4,535 companies on Scope I greenhouse gas emissions in tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2e). Scope I 




(e.g., the fossil fuels burned while making steel), whereas Scope II emissions include the 
emissions required to generate the energy that a company purchases from a third party (e.g., the 
emissions from generating the electricity to power lights at a factory), and Scope III emissions 
include all other indirect emissions from a company’s supply chain (i.e., the emissions required 
to ship a part). By only including Scope I emissions, I bias emissions towards companies that 
engage in transportation or energy generation services. Complete summary statistics for CDP 
data can be found in Table 1. CDP data allowed me to model borrowers’ yearly greenhouse gas 
emissions and potential liabilities to a carbon tax. 
Table 1 
Summary of CDP Data 
Variable Full 
Dataset 
2018 2017 2016 2015 
Number of Companies  4,535 3,348 2,477 3,340 185 
Average Emissions (tons of CO2e) 5,747,042 12,372,260 1,666,644 8,077,356 3,728,164 
Average Revenue ($k) 932,862 966,954 979,621 950,008 748,277 
Market Capitalization ($k) 1,136,709 1,173,443 1,182,798 1,152,330 506,302 
Number of Industries Represented 
(4 digit SIC Code) 
350 339 328 346 88 
Number of Industries Represented 
(3 digit SIC Code) 
240 231 225 238 79 
Number of Industries Represented 
(2 digit SIC Code) 
72 71 68 72 36 
Note. There were 64 datapoints from 2008-2014 and 2019. The number of datapoints in each 




Limitations of CDP data include its lack of auditing and industry coverage. Because CDP 
data is voluntarily self-reported and not audited, it may be unreliable (Stanny, 2018). Self-
reporting also creates a response bias, meaning that companies who respond to the survey may 
not be representative of the larger population. Companies with high emissions or low profit 
margins are underrepresented in the dataset (Giannarakis et al., 2017; Datt et al., 2019). 
Although the CDP dataset excluded the eight industries listed in Table 2, none of the industries 
that it excluded are known as high-emissions industries. The lack of data from these industries 
meant that I had to exclude companies in those industries from my dataset. 
Table 2 
Two-Digit SIC Codes Missing from CDP Data 
Two Digit SIC Code Industry  
89 Miscellaneous 
76 Miscellaneous Repair 
72 Dry cleaners, laundromats, barber shops 
57 Home Furnishing 
55 Automotive Dealers 
83 Social Services 
82 Educational Services 
 
Corporate Lending Data 
DealScan is a database that contains information on corporate loan issuance, primarily in 
the U.S. I drew corporate lending data from DealScan. Carey and Nini (2007) found that 
DealScan contains roughly 90% of loans (excluding “very small loans”) that are syndicated in 




I used the data from DealScan to model the composition of financial institutions’ lending 
portfolios. 
There are several important limitations in the DealScan data. Because DealScan data only 
covers syndicated loans, it does not include bilateral agreements between companies and 
financial institutions. If these data were included in my model, the predictions for total losses due 
to climate change would be more severe. Accordingly, this limitation is likely to mean that 
climate-related risks are even greater than those predicted by my model. Because some loans 
reported in DealScan were not associated with an equity ticker, I could not pull necessary 
company information. As a result, I excluded 3,451 out of 4,109 borrowers from my model due 
to partial data. Finally, because the DealScan database only contains new loan issuance, I 
assumed that financial institutions buy and sell loans in equal volume and do not sell loans to 
companies in specific industries at a higher frequency than those to companies in other 
industries. 
Corporate Financial Data 
I drew corporate financial data from CapitalIQ. CapitalIQ is a data aggregator that pulls 
information from SEC filings (primarily 10K and 10Q filings) to build out a company’s financial 
profile. It contains data on companies worldwide. I used data from CapitalIQ as inputs for 
Merton’s model (1974) for probability of default. 
CapitalIQ’s data limitations included poor international ticker-to-company conversion 
and infrequent mistakes. I excluded most international companies from my analysis because 
CapitalIQ misidentified them as American companies and returned incorrect data. Additionally, 




(Boritz & No, 2019). Many of these discrepancies cause significant changes in probability of 
default calculations (Boritz & No, 2019).  
Table 3 
Summary of DealScan Data 
Variable All Current 
American 
Facilities 




Facilities 26,337 14,156 11,049 8,387 
Lenders 7,403 1,656 1,452 536 
Borrowers 10,110 6,685 5,052 4,109 
Average Facility Quantum $381,832,545 $364,539,025 $360,332,300 $409,432,200 
Note. Current American facilities are USD denominated facilities syndicated in the U.S. that 
have a facility start date after Jan. 1, 1989 and maturity date after January 29, 2021. American 
Non-Financial Borrowers are companies with Primary SIC codes outside the range 6000-6999 
whose “Country” field on DealScan is “USA”. Bank Lenders are those whose “InstitutionType” 
on DealScan is either “US Bank” or “Investment Bank” 
3.1.2 Data Construction 
To prepare the data for use in my model, I removed all incomplete data or data unrelated 
to American financial institutions. I began with all DealScan facilities with a maturity date after 
1/29/2021 and a start date after 1/1/1990. I then filtered out all loans that were not classified as a 
“Term Loan …” or a “Delayed Draw Term Loan” because other loans may not be funded (i.e., 
the financial institution may have made a commitment to the company, but not actually paid it 
anything yet), and the financial institution may have the right to refuse funding if the company 




SIC Code in the 6000’s) and non-American borrowers, because they are outside the scope of this 
project. Next, I eliminated any lenders that were not classified in the InstitutionType as “US 
Bank” or “Investment Bank,” because they are outside the scope of this thesis.  
After creating the list of American facilities, lenders, and borrowers that fell within the 
scope of this thesis, I drew financial data on those borrowers from CapitalIQ. I grouped the 
companies by their UltimateParentIDs in DealScan (which maps subsidiary companies to their 
parents), because larger companies are easier to match with their CapitalIQ entry than smaller 
companies. There were 4,109 parent companies. A ticker was available in DealScan for 1,473 
parent companies which allowed matching with their CapitalIQ company profile. 
For companies that did not have a ticker in DealScan I used the DealScan/Compustat 
match table created by Schwert (2018). This link table contains GV Keys, which can be used to 
identify companies, along with DealScan FacilityIDs and DealScan CompanyIDs. However, 
because 67 out the 1,182 borrowers that are in the link table have different GV keys across 
different facilities, I first attempted to match companies by facility. If the facility was not in the 
link table and the borrower only had one GV Key in the link table, I used the GV Key based on 
the borrower’s DealScan Borrower ID to pull financial data from CapitalIQ. This data screening 
methodology is depicted graphically in Figure 3. In total, I was able to locate an identifier for 
1,314 out of 4,109 companies. CapitalIQ only accepted 707 of these companies, and only 647 
companies were associated with enough data to be usable. Nonetheless, these 647 companies 






Data Screening Methodology 
 
Note. I followed this methodology to narrow data to match the scope of this thesis. 
3.2 Theoretical Approach 
My theoretical methodology consisted of three steps: predicting borrowers’ exposures to 
transition risk in the form of a carbon tax, modeling a company’s marginal probability of default 
due to that liability, and aggregating borrowers’ probabilities of default at the industry and 
financial institution levels. I treated the assessed carbon tax as a liability on a company level in 
calculations of probability of default. I multiplied marginal probability of default (the increase in 
probability of default due to the carbon tax) by the loans quantum and a recovery rate to 






3.2.1 Borrower Exposure to Transition Risk 
Since carbon taxes depend directly on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to calculate a 
borrower’s exposure to transition risk from a carbon tax, I modelled the borrower’s yearly GHG 
emissions. Because companies are not required to disclose their GHG emissions, I used 
incomplete self-reported data from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) to project emissions. If 
the CDP dataset contained the borrower, I used the borrower’s average reported emissions 
between 2008 and 2019 (for all years that there were data). Approximately 19.5% of borrowers 
were included in at least one CDP report. For the rest of the companies in the sample, I predicted 
carbon emissions using company characteristics such as their industry classifications. 
According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (2006) certain sectors, 
such as transportation or heavy industry, produce outsized amounts of carbon emissions. 
Therefore, If the CDP dataset did not contain information on a specific borrower, I used average 
carbon intensity per dollar of revenue (carbon intensity) for companies in the borrower’s industry 
to model emissions. To determine a borrower’s industry, I use its Standard Industrial 
Classification Code (SIC code). SIC codes have three tiers: Major Group (two-digit code), 
Industry Group (three-digit code), and Industry (four-digit code). I used the most specific SIC 
code (either two-, three-, or four-digit) for which there were data. Overall, the CDP dataset 
contained actual data for 19.5% of portfolio companies, Industry level data for 45.5% of 
portfolio companies, Industry Group Level data for 18.8% of portfolio companies, Major Group 
level for 11.4% of portfolio companies, and no data for 4.7% of portfolio companies. I then 
multiplied the portfolio company’s implied carbon intensity (i.e., how much I predict the 
company will emit per dollar of revenue based on its industry) by its revenue from the year 2020 




To calculate tax liabilities, I multiplied portfolio companies’ taxable emissions by a 
hypothetical carbon tax. I chose to analyze the impact of a range of carbon taxes from $5/ton 
CO2e to $150/ton CO2e because the range of values that scientists and policy experts are 
predicting is large, and providing a range allows governments to assess the impact of different 
levels of taxation on financial stability or of a carbon tax in addition to other transition risks. I 
selected the specific range of carbon taxes to consider based on research on carbon pricing.  
The literature on carbon price is broken up into two categories: the price of carbon 
necessary to offset emissions-based externalities (social cost of carbon) and the price of carbon 
necessary to meet a predetermined goal (e.g., keep global temperatures from rising 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels). Peer-reviewed assessments of the social cost of carbon 
range from -$13.36 to $2,386.91 per ton of carbon dioxide with a mean of $54.71 (Wang et al., 
2019) The mean of $54.71 is also in line with the Biden administrations’ most recent 
(Interagency Working Group, 2021) assessment of the social cost of carbon, which gave an 
estimate for the social cost of carbon between $14 and $152 per ton of CO2e and a best guess of 
$51 per ton of CO2e. 
Common targets on which carbon taxes are based include reaching net-zero emissions 
and meeting goals set in the Paris Accords. Kaufman et al. (2020) found that for the U.S. to reach 
net zero emissions by 2050, the government would be required to implement a carbon tax 
between $34 and $64 by 2025. Similarly, Chen and Hafstead (2016) found that to reach its Paris 
Accord goal of reducing emissions by 26%-28% by 2020, the U.S. would be required to 
implement a carbon tax of $20.78 in 2013 dollars (or $23.46 in 2020 dollars). Given that most 




case, but also included most of the Biden administration’s range of estimates, from $5/ton to 
$150/ton in my analyses. 
I assessed the impact of this range of carbon taxes on probabilities of default over one, 
two-, three-, four-, and five-year time horizons to see how the implications of the carbon tax will 
differ over different time horizons. My base case is a five-year time horizon because a carbon tax 
ideally will stay in effect into perpetuity, but eventually portfolio companies will change their 
operations to minimize tax burden. 
3.2.2 Marginal Probability of Default and Loan Losses 
To calculate borrowers’ marginal probabilities of default from a carbon tax, I calculated 
the probability of default using Merton’s model (1974), as described below, before and after a 
carbon tax. My Python implementation of this methodology can be found in Appendix F. 
Merton’s Default Model 
Merton’s model for probability of default treats a company’s capital structure as a 
European call option (an option to buy an equity at a specified price on a specified date) and uses 
the Black-Scholes equation to find the probability that a company enters default. For a full 
explanation of European call options and a derivation of the Black-Scholes equation, see 
Appendix G.  
At its core, Merton’s model (1974) assumes that a company is in default when the value 
of its liabilities exceeds the value of its assets. This assumption, (along with the assumptions that 
the equity does not pay dividends, assets grow at the risk-free rate, and there is no coupon on the 
debt) allows one to value a company’s equity as a European call option where the value of the 
borrower’s assets is analogous to the price of the option’s underlying equity. This relationship is 




the strike price. Just as the value of the option on the date it expires equals the difference 
between the value of the underlying equity and the strike price (or zero, if greater), the value of a 
company’s equity equals the difference between the value of the company’s assets and its 
liabilities (but no less than zero). Plugging liabilities into strike price, asset volatility into equity 
volatility, and equity value into option value in the Black-Scholes equations (found in Appendix 
G) yields Formulas 1 through 3 where A is the asset value, L represents company liabilities, r is 
the risk-free rate, t is the time period, 𝜎𝐴=Asset Volatility, and N(x) is the cumulative normal 
distribution of x. 
Assuming one knows correct values for all specified variables and knows that N(d2) in 
the Black Scholes formula is equal to the probability that the option is in the money, one can 
calculate the probability that an option is out of the money (which is analogous to a company 
being in default), by subtracting N(d2) from 1, yielding probability of default. However, it is 
difficult to know true asset values or asset volatility because companies only disclose their 
financials once per quarter. 














𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴 ∗  √𝑡 (2) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − L ∗ 𝑒−𝑟∗𝑡 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) 
(3) 
 
However, since public companies’ asset values are only published quarterly, I implied 
portfolio companies’ asset values and asset volatilities based on equity value and equity 




Merton’s model to solve for asset values for all trading days in a year. To determine the asset 
volatility, I took the standard deviation of the natural log of day-on-day returns of the implied 
asset. I compared the implied asset values' volatility to the initial value for asset volatility. If the 
difference was greater than .001, I repeated this process using the new asset volatility that I 
calculated as my guess. Using the asset values and volatilities that I calculated from the 
converged model, I calculated the probability of default with the borrower’s existing liabilities 
alone and added the carbon tax calculated in the first step to existing liabilities to calculate 
marginal probability of default.  
Figure 4.  
Graphical Depiction of Merton’s Model for PD 
  
Note. Merton’s model for probability of default assumes returns on asset value are normally 
distributed. The probability that a company will be in default at time t is the probability that 



















For simplicity’s sake, I assumed that borrowers would not change their behavior to 
decrease their GHG emissions and tax exposure over the one, two-, three-, four-, and five-year 
time horizons. I counted the carbon tax exposure in year one as short-term debt and the carbon 
tax exposures in years two through five (in scenarios that included those years) as long-term 
debt, because a carbon tax due in those years is similar to a debt instrument with a maturity date 
in those years. I only counted half of a company’s long-term liabilities towards a company’s 
liabilities in Merton’s model to adjust for the possibility that long-term debt will be restructured 
or that assets might briefly exceed liabilities before the debt’s maturity date. I then used Merton’s 
model to calculate probability of default based on a risk-free rate of 2%, 252 trading days in a 
year, company’s assets, a company’s liabilities (with and without carbon tax liabilities), and a 
company’s asset volatility to calculate marginal probability of default on a company-by-
company basis due to the carbon tax. 
To calculate expected loan losses, I multiplied the marginal probabilities of default by 
loan quantum and a recovery rate (the percentage of loan a lender will be able to recover if a 
borrower goes into default). According to Ou et al. (2021), the average recovery rate on a 
secured loan (which most term loans are) was 69% in 2020. However, if a portfolio company is 
going into default because of a carbon tax, its assets are likely intended for use in emissions-
intensive processes. This fact is likely to reduce the assets’ resale value in a world with a carbon 
tax. To consider this risk, I examined a scenario with a 0% recovery rate and a 69% recovery 





Aggregation and Analysis of Probabilities of Default 
Once I generated marginal probabilities of default at the borrower level, I aggregated the 
borrowers at the systematic, industry, and financial institution level. To understand the relation 
between emissions and probability of default and to determine if high emitters have different 
existing debt burdens than low emitters, I determined the distributions of emissions and tax 
burden at the company and industry level. I determined the total loan quantum included in my 
dataset and compared that quantum to the actual amount of Commercial, Industrial, and 
Commercial Real Estate Loans in the U.S., reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2021b). To assess systematic risk, I multiplied the 
ratio of loan losses to loan base by the actual loan quantum in the U.S. and compared the result 
to losses under the 2020 CCAR stress test’s severely adverse scenario. At the industry level, I 
grouped loan losses by two-, three-, and four-digit SIC code to find which industries were the 
greatest emitters. At the financial institution level, I distributed each facility’s loan losses to each 
financial institution that lends to that facility evenly, then scaled those losses to match the 
financial institution’s actual U.S. lending portfolio. Because financial institutions do not disclose 
the geographic breakdown of their lending portfolio, I scaled their total portfolio by the 
percentage of revenue that is derived from the Americas to arrive at their American loan 
portfolio (most financial institutions did not have country-level data and assumed that most 








In this section, I explore the extent to which baseline probabilities of default (PDs) that 
my model calculated without any carbon tax are comparable to other researched values for PDs. 
Next, I investigate the extent to which the presence of a carbon tax would establish marginal 
probabilities of default (MPDs) and the drivers of those MPDs. I then determine the implied 
liabilities those MPDs create for U.S. financial markets, industries, and financial institutions.  
4.1 Probabilities of Default Before Carbon Tax 
I first analyzed the PDs for companies in my dataset without any carbon tax and 
compared those PDs to baseline values established in the literature. I found that that the average 
PD ranged from 8.46% over a time horizon of one year to 20.38% over a time horizon of five 
years, as Table 4 shows. Since these averages are higher than researched values for PDs, 
Merton’s model is likely overestimating values of PDs for companies in my dataset. This 
overestimation of PD in the case without a carbon tax means that average PDs in all other 
scenarios are also likely too high. However, the elevated PDs should not have a very large 
impact on MPDs, because both the baseline PDs and carbon tax PDs will be elevated. 
Additionally, percentage changes in PDs should not be impacted, again since both baseline and 
carbon tax PDs should be impacted by the same percentage factor. Table 4 contains average 










1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years  
(Base Case) 
Average PD 8.32% 11.82% 14.92% 17.72% 20.26% 
Note. Across all time horizons, probabilities of default without a carbon tax are higher than 
would be expected based on the literature. 
 
4.2 Marginal Probability of Default 
After I determined base levels of PD, shown in Table 5, I analyzed how different levels 
of a carbon tax would change those baseline PDs. I found that average MPD arising from the 
carbon tax ranged from 0.03% over one year with a tax of $5/ton of CO2e to 1.6% over five 
years with a tax of $150/ton of CO2e, as Table 6 shows. For my base case of $50/ton over five 
years, I found that the MPD averaged 0.60%. However, the distribution of MPD was skewed 
right, meaning that a few companies suffered a dramatic increase in PD while others suffered 
almost no increase in PD. This disparity is exemplified by the fact that the median MPD only 
ranged from 0.00001% in the one-year, $5/ton scenario to 0.0491% in the five-year, $150/ton 
scenario, as Table 7 shows and Figure 5 shows graphically. Even in the scenario with the most 
extreme carbon tax, the median company’s PD remains practically unchanged. The fact that 
median MPD is so much lower than average MPD likely means that a few companies are 
accounting for most of the marginal probability of default. Since median MPD represents the 
“average” company, most companies’ risks of default would not materially change. The PD and 
MPD values for all scenarios can be found in Appendices A and B, respectively. Generally, the 
MPDs increase linearly as carbon taxes increase. The skew in values of MPD can be explained 




Table 5.  
Summary of Average Probabilities of Default by Scenario 
 Time Horizon 
Carbon Tax ($) 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
(Base Case) 
0 8.32% 11.82% 14.92% 17.72% 20.26% 
50 (Base Case) 8.46% 12.05% 15.29% 18.22% 20.87% 
100 8.57% 12.30% 15.65% 18.67% 21.39% 
150 8.69% 12.55% 16.00% 19.09% 21.87% 
 
Note. These probabilities of default are the baseline values off which marginal probabilities of default are 
calculated. 
Table 6.  
Summary of Average Marginal Probabilities of Default by Scenario 
 Time Horizon 
Carbon Tax ($) 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
(Base Case) 
50 (Base Case) 0.14% 0.23% 0.37% 0.50% 0.61% 
100 0.24% 0.48% 0.73% 0.95% 1.13% 
150 0.37% 0.73% 1.08% 1.37% 1.61% 






Table 7.  
Summary of Median Marginal Probabilities of Default by Scenario 
 Time Horizon 
Carbon Tax ($) 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
(Base Case) 
50 (Base Case) 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 
100 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 
150 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 
Note. Median marginal probabilities of default are much lower than average probabilities of 
default. This difference indicates that a few companies are accounting for most of the marginal 






Figure 5.  
Probabilities and Marginal Probabilities of Default 
Figure 5a.  
Probabilities of Default 
 
Figure 5b.  
Marginal Probabilities of Default 
 
Note. Economy-wide probabilities of default increase linearly as carbon taxes increase in 
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research suggests they should be. It is critical to note that the median PD/MPD numbers better 
represent what would happen to the “average” company that is not in a high emissions industry, 
whereas the mean PD/MPD represent the effect across all companies. Although the trends in 
mean and median MPD are similar, the fact that in absolute terms, median PD is practically 0 
while mean PD is much larger provides evidence that a few companies are being severely 
impacted by a carbon tax, while most companies are barely impacted at all. 
To determine what was causing the skew in the distribution of MPDs, I investigated the 
distribution of emissions and carbon tax burdens. I found that certain companies accounted for 
most emissions and most of the total carbon tax burden. I estimated that the average portfolio 
company emits 689,361 tons of CO2e per year, which is materially lower than the average 
emissions in the CDP Database. This lower average emissions statistic does not mean that 
financial institutions are avoiding lending to high-emissions industries because the companies in 
the CDP database are not necessarily representative of the larger economy. However, As Figure 
6 shows, the distribution of company emissions was skewed right, and the number of companies 
in each emissions bracket decreased exponentially. In fact, 387 companies emit less than 1,000 
tons of CO2e per year, but 12 companies emit more than 10,000,000 tons of CO2e per year. As a 
result, the median quantity of CO2e emissions is only 10,727 tons and the first and third quartile 
CO2e emissions are 878 tons and 80,093 tons, respectively. Because carbon taxes are determined 
by emissions, the relative burden of the carbon tax is also focused heavily on a handful of 
companies. 
In the base case ($50/ton carbon tax over five years), I found that portfolio companies 
were liable for a discounted total (liabilities after one year are counted as long term liabilities and 




1.51% of portfolio company revenue. However, the carbon tax liabilities ranged from practically 
0% of revenue to over 71% of revenue. Because the distribution is skewed right, the median ratio 
of carbon tax to non-carbon tax liabilities was 0.06%, as Figure 7 shows. In fact, the top 1.5% of 
emitters in the dataset accounted for just over 60% of the total carbon tax liability. The skewed 
distribution of carbon taxes explains why the distribution of MPDs was also skewed. A full table 
of carbon taxes as percentage of liabilities can be found in Appendix C. 
Figure 6.  
Distribution of Company Emissions 
 
Note. Certain companies emit a far larger amount of greenhouse gasses than others do. 















































Figure 7.  
Distribution of Carbon Taxes as a Percentage of Company Revenue
 
Note. The distribution of emissions as a percentage of revenues is skewed right, just as the 
distribution of emissions. This skew also supports the fact that certain companies bear the brunt 
of the burden from a carbon tax. 
 
Additionally, Figure 8 shows that although the companies with the highest leverage have 
very low emissions, when excluding high leverage companies, there is a positive correlation 
between leverage and emissions. This means that companies with high emissions are likely to 
have more debt to begin with than companies with low emissions and amplifies the effect that 








Distribution of Emissions and Leverage 
Figure 8a. 
Full Distribution of Emissions and Leverage 
 
Note. When looking at the distribution of all companies’ leverage and emissions, there seems to 
be an inverse relationship between emissions and leverage. 
Figure 8b. 
Distribution of Emissions and Leverage, Excluding Highly Levered Companies 
 
Note. However, when excluding companies with extremely high leverage (liabilities > 
2*Revenue), there appears to be a positive correlation between emissions and leverage. This 





























































4.3 Cumulative Commercial, Industrial, and Commercial Real Estate Loan 
Losses 
I multiplied MPDs by the value of loans and by a recovery rate, or the percentage of a 
loan that a lender will recover if the borrower defaults, to calculate projected loan losses. I then 
scaled projected loan losses to match market quantities of debt. Assuming a 0% recovery rate in 
my base case, I found that industry-wide losses would total $30.30Bn scaled to include 
commercial, industrial, and commercial real estate loans, and would fall to $9.39Bn scaled 
assuming the industry wide average recovery weight of 69%. However, I put more weight on the 
0% recovery rate scenario, given that if a carbon tax is severe enough to force a company into 
bankruptcy, its assets are likely intended for use in emissions-intensive processes. Because a 
carbon tax would make those processes uneconomical, the value of assets that secured the loan 
would be impaired. Full tables of losses in each scenario, including unscaled losses and losses 
only scaled to match the commercial and industrial loan market can be found in Appendix D. 
Once again, I found that losses were skewed to the right, with a small number of firms 
accounting for most of the impact. After determining the cumulative losses in loan markets, I 
aggregated those losses by industry. 
4.4 Loan Losses by Industry 
To investigate whether companies in certain industries were more likely to go into default 
than companies in other industries I aggregated carbon tax liabilities and loan losses by SIC 
code. I found that a few industries at the two-, three-, and four-digit SIC code level accounted for 
most carbon emissions/carbon tax liabilities. As Table 8 shows, the top ten two-digit SIC codes 




Services; independently accounted for 59.05% of the carbon tax burden. Although many of the 
industries in the top ten emitted large quantities of GHG per revenue dollar (i.e., Electric Gas, 
and Sanitary Services, Furniture and Fixtures, Transportation, and Heavy Construction), others 
had very low emissions, but were classified in the top ten because they earn large quantities of 
revenue (i.e., Apparel and Accessory Stores and Wholesale Trade), or made up a large 
percentage of the loans made by financial institutions. Just as the burden of the carbon tax was 
concentrated in certain companies and certain industries, MPDs due to the carbon tax were also 
concentrated among a few companies and industries. 
Table 8. 
Top Ten Industries by Carbon Tax Burden 
SIC 
Code 




Tax as Percentage 
of Revenue 
Percentage 





Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 
Services 
59.05% 12.14% 5.37% 6.89 
50 
Wholesale Trade – Durable 
Goods 
12.78% 0.05% 2.13% 454.27 
45 Air Transportation 5.19% 5.54% 2.34% 4.26 
28 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
2.33% 0.51% 8.25% 6.08 
16 Heavy Construction 1.96% 5.63% 0.31% 3.49 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1.95% 11.14% 0.19% 3.06 
51 
Wholesale Trade – 
Nondurable Goods 
1.86% 0.68% 2.80% 21.86 
44 Water Transportation 1.77% 7.11% 1.03% 6.62 





Apparel and Accessory 
Stores 
1.42% 0.01% 0.10% 879.43 
Note. The ten industries that bear the highest carbon tax burdens do so because they emit large 
quantities of greenhouse gases for every dollar of revenue that they earn, they make up a large 
percentage of financial institutions’ loan portfolios, or they generate large amounts of revenue. 
4.5 Financial Institution Level Exposures 
To determine whether individual financial institutions face serious climate risk, I 
aggregated loans by financial institution. I found that just as certain companies and industries 
would suffer disproportionately from a carbon tax, so too would certain financial institutions. Of 
the 19 American Domestic Systematically Important Banks (DSIB), Global Systematically 
Important Banks (GSIB) and companies with outsized carbon tax liabilities for which I had data, 
Comerica Bank was an outlier, with loan losses totaling 1.24% of its lending portfolio. The next 
closest financial institution only lost 0.69% of its portfolio, as Table 9 shows. This unequal 
distribution of climate risk by bank indicates that although the American financial system may 
not face fragility because of climate change, certain financial institutions may. 
My results also indicate that some of these individual financial institutions may be taking 
on climate risk knowingly, while others may not be. One might expect that financial institutions 
that have higher risk tolerance in general would have higher risk tolerance to climate risk, 
indicating a conscious effort on the part of financial institutions to treat climate risk similarly to 
other risk, but that is not the case. I found that the coefficient of correlation between a financial 
institution’s comparative rank for general loan losses and loan losses due to climate change is 
only 0.082. However, as Table 9 shows, certain financial institutions (Truist, Bank of America, 




change, which indicates that although financial institutions as a group may not be meaningfully 
considering climate risk, certain institutions may be.  
Additionally, my results indicate most of the exposure to climate risk in banks with the 
largest overall exposure comes from the same industry. Table 10 shows the top three industry 
exposures for each bank. For all six financial institutions with the largest carbon tax exposure, 
the two industries that accounted for most of their carbon tax burden were air transportation (SIC 
code 45) and electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC code 49). This indicates that if financial 
institutions were to face instability due to climate risk it would be due to their exposures to the 


























JP Morgan $2,058.46 0.42% 1.04% 9 3 39.90% 
Bank of America $1,729.86 0.39% 0.57% 11 12 68.35% 
Citibank $918.75 0.49% 1.00% 6 4 48.54% 
Wells Fargo & Co $896.30 0.26% 0.98% 14 5 26.26% 
US Bancorp $613.20 0.47% 0.41% 7 14 113.55% 
Comerica Bank $546.91 1.24% 0.67% 1 10 184.93% 
PNC Bank NA $482.92 0.29% 0.94% 12 6 30.57% 
Truist $464.03 0.27% 0.45% 13 13 61.22% 
KeyBank $428.99 0.61% 0.82% 4 8 74.36% 
Compass Bank $276.06 0.69% 0.20% 2 18 343.62% 
Goldman Sachs & Co $252.36 0.64% 1.46% 3 1 43.77% 
Regions Bank $228.16 0.43% 0.88% 8 7 48.27% 
Huntington Bank $164.80 0.40% 0.60% 10 11 66.13% 
Fifth Third Bank $144.79 0.23% 0.77% 16 9 29.68% 
Capital One Bank $81.85 0.11% 0.40% 17 15 27.31% 
Northern Trust $56.24 0.52% 0.39% 5 16 132.07% 
Morgan Stanley Bank NA $28.18 0.04% 0.24% 18 17 15.82% 
Bank of New York Mellon $27.31 0.23% 0.16% 15 19 146.59% 






Financial Institution Exposure by Industry 
Bank 
SIC 










3 Industry 3 
Percentage of 
Liabilities 3 
JP Morgan 45 Air Transportation 39.46% 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 21.03% 25 Furniture Manufacturing 5.82% 




Citibank 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 43.80% 45 Air Transportation 32.91% 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
3.63% 
Wells Fargo & Co 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 24.67% 45 Air Transportation 16.80% 25 Furniture Manufacturing 14.65% 
US Bancorp 45 Air Transportation 41.70% 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 23.91% 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
7.44% 
Comerica Bank 45 Air Transportation 33.50% 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 31.80% 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
15.82% 
PNC Bank NA 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 43.56% 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
10.49% 12 Coal Mining 8.25% 
Truist 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
23.64% 25 Furniture Manufacturing 17.89% 16 Heavy Construction 12.88% 
KeyBank 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 73.09% 16 Heavy Construction 11.99% 73 Business Services 7.91% 
Compass Bank 36 Electronics Manufacturing 88.81% 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 7.27% 70 Hotels 1.98% 
Goldman Sachs & Co 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 50.63% 45 Air Transportation 33.74% 16 Heavy Construction 2.41% 
Regions Bank 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 43.54% 16 Heavy Construction 18.24% 12 Coal Mining 10.80% 




          
Bank 
SIC 










3 Industry 3 
Percentage of 
Liabilities 3 
Huntington Bank 12 Coal Mining 38.82% 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 25.47% 32 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and 
Concrete Manufacturing 
20.59% 
Fifth Third Bank 25 Furniture Manufacturing 33.60% 51 
Wholesale Trade - Non-
Durable 
16.02% 26 
Paper and Allied 
Products 
12.06% 
Capital One Bank 16 Heavy Construction 52.33% 73 Business Services 13.89% 13 Oil and Gas Extraction 5.10% 
Northern Trust 25 Furniture Manufacturing 54.16% 28 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 
20.59% 26 
Paper and Allied 
Products 
11.87% 
Morgan Stanley Bank 
NA 
46 Fossil Fuel Pipelines 31.97% 79 
Amusement and 
Recreation Services 
29.43% 48 Communications 22.04% 
Bank of New York 
Mellon 
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary 65.27% 26 Paper and Allied Products 32.39% 73 Business Services 0.82% 
Ally Commercial 
Finance LLC 
37 Transportation Equipment 98.13% 32 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and 
Concrete Manufacturing 








 5. DISCUSSION 
Given that climate change is rapidly causing economic destruction in the U.S. and 
globally, this thesis measures American financial institutions’ exposure to climate-induced 
transition risk in the form of a carbon tax and provides insight into the potential economic 
impacts of a carbon tax. I will discuss the implications of my analyses for systematic financial 
stability and the ways in which the implementation of a carbon tax would likely impact financial 
stability. I will also consider the implications of these results for financial regulators and 
consider limitations of my research that should be addressed in future work.  
Overall, my findings support the proposition that a carbon tax would be minimally 
disruptive for most companies, industries, and financial institutions. However, outsized climate 
risk in regional banks means that there may be concentrated risk in certain regions or industries 
that could result in sub-systemic financial instability of those regions/industries. Additionally, 
concentration of climate risk in certain industries that are important to the American economy 
could have knock-on effects and cause financial instability. Taken together, my findings support 
increased oversight of financial climate risk in smaller financial institutions. 
5.1 Implications for Financial Stability 
Measures of institutions’ financial risk at an aggregate level indicate if a carbon tax has 
the potential to create systemic financial instability. However, even if aggregate indicators of risk 
do not point to financial instability, financial instability at select financial institutions or 




Further, financial instability at regional financial institutions can create sub-systemic financial 
risk. Therefore, although my results for aggregate measures of exposure do not indicate that 
climate change will create financial instability, I find that risk at the industry level and at smaller, 
regional, financial institutions has the potential to create systemic financial risk. These findings 
are similar to those of Allen et al. (2020) in France and the CFTC in the United States. 
5.1.1 Aggregate Measures of Climate Risk 
The transition risk that a carbon tax poses to the American financial system in aggregate, 
although material, is not substantial enough to warrant regulation by itself. The cumulative size 
of loans that are unlikely to be paid back (non-performing loans) that financial institutions hold 
relative to the losses they are projected to suffer due to climate risk puts climate risk-induced 
losses into perspective. On average, loan losses due to climate risk are 79.02% of American 
financial institutions’ current non-performing loans across all divisions (not only commercial, 
industrial, and commercial real estate lending). This means that financial institutions would 
suffer almost double the loan losses that they would in normal situations due to a carbon tax, 
which is material. However, Basel III stipulates that financial institutions must hold enough 
capital to be able to withstand losses in a severely adverse scenario, meaning that financial 
institutions may be able to withstand these abnormal losses due to climate change, just as they 
would withstand losses due to an economic downturn.  
I found that in my base case scenario, loan losses would equal 6.62% of total losses in the 
2020 CCAR severely adverse scenario, scaling for the difference in loan base (CCAR only tests 
a loan base of $2.4 trillion, compared to my scaled loan base of $5.0 trillion). Across all 
scenarios with a 0% recovery rate, average losses ranged from .32% ($5/ton tax over one year) to 




impactful carbon tax would only have a fraction of the impact that the severely adverse scenario 
would. The average percentage of CCAR losses across all scenarios are listed in Appendix H. 
Given the relative scale of average losses from a carbon tax and the fact that all financial 
institutions passed the CCAR stress test in 2020, the average financial institution could almost 
certainly withstand the loan losses resulting from a carbon tax in isolation. However, climate 
change will not happen in isolation, and the causes of financial instability and fragility that the 
CCAR assessment attempts to address in a world without climate risk will also exist in a world 
with climate risk.  
Even if financial institutions’ average losses due to a carbon tax are layered on top of 
their CCAR losses, the cumulative losses are not material enough to cause systematic financial 
fragility or instability. In the 2020 CCAR severely adverse scenario, CET1 capital ratios dropped 
from an average starting value of 12.2% to an average minimum value of 9.6%. When including 
both losses due to climate change and the original CCAR losses, average CET1 ratios only fall 
0.17% further to 9.43%. Although minimum CET1 ratios vary by financial institution under 
Basel III, 9.43% is above the regulatory minimum in stressed scenarios for all financial 
institutions. Therefore, even losses from a carbon tax compounded with the losses in the 2020 
CCAR severely adverse scenario would not be enough to create cause for concern at an 
aggregate level. 
It is important to note that defaults due to transition risk would not be a one-time-event 
like the scenarios that the CCAR exercise emulate. Because these risks would continue until 
portfolio companies change their business processes to decrease their emissions, the impact of 
the risk could be larger than a short-term economic shock. In my model, I set the time horizon 




estimating Scope I emissions and excluding Scope II and III emissions, which could increase the 
scope of damages. Even with these additional losses, however, existing banking regulation 
requires that financial institutions maintain a sufficient capital buffer that climate risk is unlikely 
to cause financial instability or fragility. These results are similar to the findings of Vermeulen et 
al. (2018) and Allen et al. (2020), both of whom study financial institutions’ exposure to climate 
risk in Europe and find that financial institutions are not at risk in aggregate. However, even if 
financial institutions in aggregate do not have exposure to climate risk that warrants concern, 
groups of financial institutions or industries may. 
5.1.2 Industry Level Measures of Climate Risk 
My results indicate that the concentration of climate risk in a few industries and financial 
institutions could create wider instability. Although the 2008 financial crisis was a unique case 
and was not caused entirely by the collapse of the housing market, it is evidence for how a 
bubble bursting in one industry can have wider implications. The same could be true for the 
transition risk from a carbon tax, and especially one focused on Scope I emissions like the one 
that I modeled. Because taxes on Scope I emissions penalize industries like transportation and 
electricity generation so heavily compared to other industries, there would more likely be a 
shock in one of those industries that would have knock-on effects throughout the economy. In 
the base case scenario, electricity generators’ (SIC code 49) probabilities of default increase by 
14.97%, from 19.16% to 22.03%. Although projecting the magnitude of increase in defaults 
necessary to shock the industry is difficult, any magnitude of disruption in such an essential 
industry could have knock-on effects.  
Because so many other industries rely on electricity, a disturbance in the electricity 




instability. The failure of Texas’ power grid during a winter storm in February of 2021 could end 
up causing $155 Bn in economic damage, demonstrating the impact that a failure could have 
(Puelo, 2021). Given the concentration of carbon tax exposure in industries important to the 
American economy and the impact that high levels of default in those industries have, further 
research is warranted on the second-level impacts of implementing a carbon tax. 
5.1.3 Financial Institution Level and Regional Measures of Climate Risk 
My results indicate that financial institutions classified as GSIBs or DSIBs are not 
individually vulnerable to financial climate risk, meaning these financial institutions will not 
contribute to financial instability. However, my results also indicate that smaller and regional 
financial institutions bear outsized exposure to climate risk and may create sub-systemic 
financial instability or fragility. 
Of the financial institutions classified as DSIBs or GSIBs, loan losses due to transition 
risk ranged from 0.05% (Ally) to 10.72% (Citi) of losses in the 2020 CCAR severely adverse 
scenario. Because climate-induced losses were such a small percentage of CCAR loan losses and 
all financial institutions passed the 2020 CCAR exercise, no GSIB or DSIB financial institutions 
individually face instability due to climate change. As Table 11 shows, even if DSIBs and GSIBs 
suffer losses from a carbon tax concurrently with losses similar to those they would suffer in the 
CCAR severely adverse scenario, each financial institutions’ CET1 ratio would remain above its 
regulatory minimum. Therefore, a carbon tax would not because financial institutions classified 
as GSIBs or DSIBs to pose a threat to systematic financial stability. 
However, certain non-DSIB and non-GSIB financial institutions, most notably Comerica 
and Compass, bear an outsized exposure to climate risk from a carbon tax and are not a part of 




systemic risk, they could still create sub-systemic risk in the regions in which they operate. As 
Table 11 shows, I predict that 1.24% of Comerica’s. Outside of Comerica, the highest loan loss 
percentage is Compass (0.69%), 44.4% lower than Comerica’s. Coincidentally, although both 
financial institutions used to be classified as DSIBs and take part in the CCAR stress tests, 
neither is anymore. This means that the two financial institutions with the most relative exposure 
to climate risk are also the two financial institutions with the least oversight. However, even if 
underregulated financial institutions have the highest exposure to climate risk, these financial 
institutions would not create sub-systemic risk unless they are not appropriately accounting for 
this climate risk. 
Although both Comerica and Compass both have CET1 ratios far above their regulatory 
minimums (as shown in Table 11), they could still face instability in poor economic conditions. 
Without knowing how Comerica and Compass would fare in the CCAR severely adverse 
scenario, one cannot say whether climate risk could push them into financial instability. For 
example, Goldman Sachs’ CET1 ratio falls from 13.35% to 8.35% in the CCAR severely adverse 
scenario, and if either Comerica or Compass were to suffer similar losses, losses from climate 
risk could put them into financial instability. 
More broadly, regional financial institutions (i.e., retail-focused financial institutions with 
operations in 20 or fewer states), have outsized exposure to climate risk. In my base case, 
national financial institutions’ losses due to climate only averaged 65.7% of their non-
performing loans, whereas regional financial institutions’ losses averaged 88.7% of non-
performing loans.  Similarly, national financial institutions’ losses averaged 0.37% of their total 
loan books, whereas regional financial institutions’ losses totaled 0.43% of their total loan books. 




sample have higher exposure to climate risk, it is likely that less-regulated banks have the most 
exposure to climate risk. 
Although these smaller, less regulated financial institutions are unlikely to cause 
systematic financial instability due to their size, they have the potential to create sub-systemic 
risk in the regions that they serve. Because they are not subject to the same levels of regulatory 
scrutiny as larger banks, adverse macroeconomic conditions combined with climate risk could 
make them unstable. Although instability among these smaller financial institutions would not be 
as pernicious as systematic financial instability, it could still jeopardize liquidity for regional 
companies that rely on regional financial institutions for capital. Therefore, the potential for 
financial instability among certain institutions and regional institutions more broadly means that 
sub-systemic risk may exist among American financial institutions and may warrant regulation. 
5.2 Implications for Regulators 
My results have implications for two types of regulators: those looking to implement a 
carbon tax and those looking to regulate financial risk. My findings indicate that regulators 
looking to implement a carbon tax should not worry about the tax’s implications for systematic 
financial stability and that financial regulators should investigate implementing oversight for 
regional banks’ exposures to climate risk. 
I found a concentration of exposure to transition risk in a small number of industries, and 
within those industries, to a small number of companies. Allen et al. (2020) found the same 
industry and sub-industry concentration of climate risk with better data on company emissions 
(because their research focused on France). However, Allen et al. found a concentration of risk in 
different industries (petroleum extraction, agriculture, and mining) than I did, which is likely 




burden is similar to a study that had better emissions data, my distribution of carbon tax burden 
is also likely reliable. 
This concentration of burden means that a carbon tax will only disrupt the high-emitting 
industries that it likely intends to disrupt and will not cause widespread economic damage. Given 
that 59% of the tax burden is borne by one SIC code (code 49), most of the ten industries that 
bear the highest carbon tax burden are large emitters, and only 32% of companies would bear a 
burden of over 7% of 2020 revenues over 5 years, the carbon tax would likely target its intended 
audience closely. These findings mean that a carbon tax may be an effective tool for regulators to 
curb GHG emissions without inflicting unnecessary damage on the American economy. 
Additionally, because my results indicate that the firms that are the most vulnerable to 
climate risk have the least oversight, regulators should consider regional banks’ exposures to 
climate risk. An easy path to accomplishing this goal would be expanding the scope of the 
CCAR stress test. The two banks in my sample that have the highest exposure to climate risk 
both used to be subject to the CCAR stress test, but no longer are. Additionally, all banks that are 
subject to the CCAR stress seem adequately prepared to handle climate risk.
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1. Citations for data included in reference list following format: “Bank Name (2020)…” 
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Losses as a 
Percentage of CET1 
Capital 
Losses as a Percentage 
of CCAR Scenarios1 
Regulatory Minimum 








Tax + CCAR Losses  
JP Morgan 0.42% 1.00% 8.72% 10.50% 13.82% 13.68% 9.79% 
Bank of America 0.39% 0.98% 5.92% 9.50% 11.94% 11.82% 9.16% 
Citibank 0.49% 5.95% 7.01% 10.00% 10.60% 9.96% 9.45% 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.26% 0.65% 2.78% 9.00% 11.94% 11.86% 8.22% 
US Bank NA 0.47% 1.61% 4.61% 6.50% 9.66% 9.51% 7.54% 
Comerica Bank 1.24% 7.90% N/A 6.50% 10.34% 9.52% N/A 
PNC Bank NA 0.29% 1.22% 4.20% 7.00% 12.16% 12.01% 9.53% 
Truist 0.27% 1.23% 4.07% 6.50% 10.00% 9.88% 7.72% 
KeyBank 0.61% 3.29% 10.72% 7.00% 11.10% 10.74% 7.55% 
Compass Bank 0.69% 3.20% N/A 6.50% 12.49% 12.09% N/A 
Goldman Sachs & Co 0.64% 0.31% 3.15% 9.50% 13.39% 13.35% 8.35% 
Regions Bank 0.43% 2.17% 6.00% 6.50% 9.84% 9.63% 6.99% 
Huntington Bank 0.40% 1.85% 5.32% 7.00% 10.00% 9.81% 7.90% 
Fifth Third Bank 0.23% 0.99% 2.13% 6.50% 10.34% 10.24% 7.45% 
Capital One Bank 0.11% 0.20% 1.20% 7.00% 13.67% 13.65% 7.04% 
Northern Trust 0.52% 0.56% 8.03% 6.50% 12.83% 12.75% 12.54% 
Morgan Stanley 0.04% 0.04% 0.81% 9.50% 17.36% 17.35% 12.37% 
Bank of New York Mellon 0.23% 0.12% 5.46% 8.50% 13.14% 13.13% 11.86% 




5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
The first major limitation in my research is the scope of risks that were included in my 
model. Because physical risks are inversely correlated with transition risks, a more accurate 
model would consider the interaction between physical and transition risk. My model currently 
outputs that as carbon taxes increase, so does overall economic destruction. This relationship 
does not account for the fact that as carbon taxes increase, the rate of climate change and impact 
of physical risks decrease. If I were to include physical risk in my model, there would be less of 
a positive correlation, and potentially even a negative correlation, between carbon tax and 
economic destruction.  
Not only does my model fail to account for physical risk, but also some transition risks. 
Some forms of transition risk, such as legal risk, do not fit neatly into a carbon tax. In the 
example of legal risk, the costs are much less uniform, and therefore are not modeled as well by 
a carbon tax. Since a lawsuit is either won or lost and only filed in certain cases, it is not a 
definite cost like a carbon tax would be. Additionally, not all emissions are equally likely to 
result in a lawsuit, because many lawsuits are against companies that pollute locally (e.g., if a 
company were to pollute in a sparsely populated area, that company would be less likely to be 
sued) so there is a geographic factor in determining legal risk. If my model were to include 
transition risks that are not easily accounted for by a carbon tax, the impacts of climate change 
would be more severe. 
The second major limitation of my research is the accuracy of my data. As I discussed in 
the Data section, most emissions data are self-reported.  As such, the data can be incorrect due to 
poor data collection or to a desire to appear ecologically sustainable. Because I used self-




my emissions numbers include an additional layer that will add error. Another source of error in 
my data was created by excluding companies for which I was unable to draw financial data. The 
exclusion of companies that do not appear in the DealScan or CapitalIQ dataset, may have 
skewed my data. The relatively small size of my final sample required that I scale losses to fit 
markets, which is a further inaccuracy. The inaccuracy of financial data could skew results either 
way, depending on what the data inaccuracy is. The data limitations in my work are in contrast to 
work done by European researchers, as Europe has better emissions disclosure frameworks and 
bank loan data from central banks. 
The third major limitation to my methodology was modelling simplifications that I made 
to be able to complete the project in the allotted timeframe. For example, assuming that only half 
of long-term debts should be counted towards liabilities in Merton’s model is a simplification 
that is not necessarily accurate. Similarly, I model portfolio companies’ attempts to mitigate their 
exposure to a climate task as having a binary effect in that there is no mitigation in my model’s 
time horizon and a complete mitigation after my model’s time horizon. To avoid having too 
many scenarios, I also fixed recovery rates at 0% and 69%, but the true recovery rate probably 
lies somewhere in between the two.  
The final, and potentially most influential limitation of my research was that I only 
considered Scope I emissions. This simplification meant that electricity generation companies 
were heavily penalized, while those who consume the electricity were not. Had I included Scope 
II and III emissions the breakdown of carbon tax burden by industry would have been materially 
different, and my results likely also would have been materially different. The clumping of risk 
in certain industries that defines my results would also likely be less pronounced since Scope II 




In future research it will be important to consider physical risk. My model currently gives 
results that indicate that lower carbon taxes will create less economic disruption. However, this 
may misrepresent the truth: although we do not know what the optimal level of carbon tax is, 
there is not a simple inverse relationship between carbon tax and economic disruption. Since 
including physical risks would materially impact the relationship between carbon taxes and 









Transition risk in the form of a carbon tax does not seem to pose a systematic threat to 
financial stability. A carbon tax would only cause a serious increase in probability of default for 
a select number of firms, concentrated in a select number of industries. On average, these select 
firms make up a small enough portion of financial institutions’ portfolios that a carbon tax 
should not put them in a precarious situation.  
However, as evidenced by the fact that certain financial institutions would fare better than 
others in a scenario with a carbon tax and the fact that certain financial institutions seem to be 
considering climate risk while others do not, transition risk could create sub-systemic shocks to 
certain financial institutions, regions, or industries. High levels of default in certain industries 
(i.e., electricity generation, air transportation, etc.) could also have knock-on effects throughout 
the larger economy and ultimately create financial risk. Therefore, moving forward, regulators 






Full Tables of Average Probabilities of Default by Scenario 
 
Average Probability of Default by Year and Carbon Tax (Base Case Highlighted in Blue) 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
$0 8.32% 11.82% 14.92% 17.72% 20.26% 
$5 8.35% 11.85% 14.96% 17.77% 20.33% 
$10 8.37% 11.87% 15.00% 17.83% 20.39% 
$15 8.39% 11.89% 15.03% 17.88% 20.46% 
$20 8.40% 11.91% 15.07% 17.93% 20.52% 
$25 8.41% 11.94% 15.11% 17.98% 20.58% 
$30 8.42% 11.96% 15.14% 18.02% 20.64% 
$35 8.43% 11.98% 15.18% 18.07% 20.70% 
$40 8.44% 12.01% 15.22% 18.12% 20.76% 
$45 8.45% 12.03% 15.25% 18.17% 20.81% 
$50 8.46% 12.05% 15.29% 18.22% 20.87% 
$55 8.47% 12.08% 15.33% 18.26% 20.92% 
$60 8.48% 12.10% 15.36% 18.31% 20.98% 
$65 8.49% 12.12% 15.40% 18.36% 21.03% 
$70 8.50% 12.15% 15.43% 18.40% 21.09% 
$75 8.51% 12.17% 15.47% 18.45% 21.14% 
$80 8.52% 12.20% 15.51% 18.49% 21.19% 
$85 8.54% 12.22% 15.54% 18.54% 21.24% 
$90 8.55% 12.25% 15.58% 18.58% 21.29% 
$95 8.56% 12.27% 15.62% 18.63% 21.34% 
$100 8.57% 12.30% 15.65% 18.67% 21.39% 
$105 8.58% 12.32% 15.69% 18.71% 21.44% 
$110 8.59% 12.35% 15.72% 18.76% 21.49% 
$115 8.60% 12.37% 15.76% 18.80% 21.54% 
$120 8.62% 12.40% 15.79% 18.84% 21.59% 
$125 8.63% 12.42% 15.83% 18.88% 21.64% 
$130 8.64% 12.45% 15.86% 18.93% 21.68% 
$135 8.65% 12.47% 15.90% 18.97% 21.73% 
$140 8.66% 12.50% 15.93% 19.01% 21.78% 
$145 8.68% 12.52% 15.97% 19.05% 21.82% 





Median Probability of Default by Year and Carbon Tax (Base Case Highlighted in Blue) 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
$0 0.0195% 0.7368% 2.5836% 5.1234% 7.9533% 
$5 0.0199% 0.7586% 2.5861% 5.2912% 7.9947% 
$10 0.0199% 0.7587% 2.6236% 5.3052% 7.9948% 
$15 0.0204% 0.7835% 2.6573% 5.3192% 8.0150% 
$20 0.0207% 0.7933% 2.6574% 5.3671% 8.0429% 
$25 0.0207% 0.7963% 2.6575% 5.3673% 8.0513% 
$30 0.0208% 0.7977% 2.6576% 5.3675% 8.0597% 
$35 0.0208% 0.7990% 2.6577% 5.3752% 8.0680% 
$40 0.0208% 0.8004% 2.6578% 5.3893% 8.0764% 
$45 0.0216% 0.8109% 2.6579% 5.4023% 8.0901% 
$50 0.0224% 0.8112% 2.6642% 5.4023% 8.1139% 
$55 0.0225% 0.8115% 2.6925% 5.4023% 8.1244% 
$60 0.0225% 0.8118% 2.6934% 5.4310% 8.1349% 
$65 0.0226% 0.8120% 2.8017% 5.4327% 8.1658% 
$70 0.0226% 0.8123% 2.8241% 5.4739% 8.1664% 
$75 0.0226% 0.8126% 2.8250% 5.5161% 8.2436% 
$80 0.0227% 0.8129% 2.8402% 5.5178% 8.2438% 
$85 0.0227% 0.8397% 2.8407% 5.5194% 8.2447% 
$90 0.0228% 0.8581% 2.8631% 5.5277% 8.2449% 
$95 0.0228% 0.8689% 2.8680% 5.5281% 8.2450% 
$100 0.0229% 0.8690% 2.8681% 5.5822% 8.2452% 
$105 0.0229% 0.8690% 2.8682% 5.6361% 8.2801% 
$110 0.0232% 0.8691% 2.8684% 5.6362% 8.2819% 
$115 0.0239% 0.8691% 2.8804% 5.6364% 8.3180% 
$120 0.0239% 0.8691% 2.9679% 5.7583% 8.4715% 
$125 0.0239% 0.8692% 2.9681% 5.7635% 8.4733% 
$130 0.0239% 0.8702% 2.9684% 5.7687% 8.4751% 
$135 0.0239% 0.8702% 2.9687% 5.8671% 8.4768% 
$140 0.0241% 0.8702% 2.9689% 5.8673% 8.4786% 
$145 0.0261% 0.8702% 3.0112% 5.8674% 8.4804% 






Full Tables of Average Probabilities of Default by Scenario 
 
Average Marginal Probability of Default by Year and Carbon Tax (Base Case Highlighted in Blue) 
 
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
 $5  0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.07% 
 $10  0.05% 0.05% 0.08% 0.10% 0.13% 
 $15  0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.16% 0.20% 
 $20  0.07% 0.10% 0.15% 0.21% 0.26% 
 $25  0.08% 0.12% 0.19% 0.26% 0.32% 
 $30  0.10% 0.14% 0.22% 0.30% 0.38% 
 $35  0.11% 0.16% 0.26% 0.35% 0.44% 
 $40  0.12% 0.19% 0.30% 0.40% 0.49% 
 $45  0.13% 0.21% 0.33% 0.45% 0.55% 
 $50  0.14% 0.23% 0.37% 0.50% 0.61% 
 $55  0.15% 0.26% 0.41% 0.54% 0.66% 
 $60  0.16% 0.28% 0.44% 0.59% 0.72% 
 $65  0.17% 0.31% 0.48% 0.64% 0.77% 
 $70  0.18% 0.33% 0.51% 0.68% 0.82% 
 $75  0.19% 0.35% 0.55% 0.73% 0.88% 
 $80  0.20% 0.38% 0.59% 0.77% 0.93% 
 $85  0.21% 0.40% 0.62% 0.82% 0.98% 
 $90  0.22% 0.43% 0.66% 0.86% 1.03% 
 $95  0.23% 0.45% 0.69% 0.91% 1.08% 
 $100  0.24% 0.48% 0.73% 0.95% 1.13% 
 $105  0.26% 0.50% 0.77% 0.99% 1.18% 
 $110  0.27% 0.53% 0.80% 1.04% 1.23% 
 $115  0.28% 0.55% 0.84% 1.08% 1.28% 
 $120  0.29% 0.58% 0.87% 1.12% 1.33% 
 $125  0.30% 0.60% 0.91% 1.16% 1.38% 
 $130  0.32% 0.63% 0.94% 1.21% 1.42% 
 $135  0.33% 0.66% 0.98% 1.25% 1.47% 
 $140  0.34% 0.68% 1.01% 1.29% 1.52% 
 $145  0.35% 0.71% 1.05% 1.33% 1.56% 
 $150  0.37% 0.73% 1.08% 1.37% 1.61%  





Median Marginal Probability of Default by Year and Carbon Tax (Base Case Highlighted in Blue) 
 
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
 $5  0.0000% 0.0002% 0.0005% 0.0010% 0.0016% 
 $10  0.0000% 0.0003% 0.0011% 0.0020% 0.0031% 
 $15  0.0000% 0.0005% 0.0016% 0.0030% 0.0047% 
 $20  0.0000% 0.0007% 0.0022% 0.0042% 0.0065% 
 $25  0.0000% 0.0009% 0.0027% 0.0052% 0.0081% 
 $30  0.0001% 0.0010% 0.0033% 0.0063% 0.0097% 
 $35  0.0001% 0.0012% 0.0039% 0.0073% 0.0114% 
 $40  0.0001% 0.0014% 0.0045% 0.0083% 0.0130% 
 $45  0.0001% 0.0015% 0.0050% 0.0094% 0.0146% 
 $50  0.0001% 0.0017% 0.0056% 0.0104% 0.0162% 
 $55  0.0001% 0.0019% 0.0061% 0.0115% 0.0178% 
 $60  0.0001% 0.0020% 0.0067% 0.0125% 0.0195% 
 $65  0.0001% 0.0023% 0.0073% 0.0138% 0.0211% 
 $70  0.0001% 0.0025% 0.0078% 0.0148% 0.0227% 
 $75  0.0001% 0.0026% 0.0084% 0.0159% 0.0243% 
 $80  0.0001% 0.0028% 0.0089% 0.0170% 0.0259% 
 $85  0.0002% 0.0030% 0.0095% 0.0180% 0.0276% 
 $90  0.0002% 0.0032% 0.0101% 0.0194% 0.0293% 
 $95  0.0002% 0.0033% 0.0107% 0.0209% 0.0310% 
 $100  0.0002% 0.0035% 0.0112% 0.0221% 0.0327% 
 $105  0.0002% 0.0037% 0.0118% 0.0232% 0.0343% 
 $110  0.0002% 0.0039% 0.0124% 0.0243% 0.0360% 
 $115  0.0002% 0.0041% 0.0129% 0.0254% 0.0376% 
 $120  0.0002% 0.0042% 0.0135% 0.0265% 0.0393% 
 $125  0.0002% 0.0044% 0.0141% 0.0276% 0.0409% 
 $130  0.0002% 0.0046% 0.0146% 0.0287% 0.0425% 
 $135  0.0003% 0.0048% 0.0152% 0.0298% 0.0442% 
 $140  0.0003% 0.0049% 0.0158% 0.0309% 0.0458% 
 $145  0.0003% 0.0051% 0.0163% 0.0320% 0.0474% 






Relative Carbon Tax Burdens Overall and by Industry 
Carbon Tax Liability as a Percentage of Liabilities 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
5 0.59% 0.88% 1.18% 1.47% 1.77% 
10 1.18% 1.77% 2.36% 2.95% 3.54% 
15 1.77% 2.65% 3.54% 4.42% 5.31% 
20 2.36% 3.54% 4.72% 5.89% 7.07% 
25 2.95% 4.42% 5.89% 7.37% 8.84% 
30 3.54% 5.31% 7.07% 8.84% 10.61% 
35 4.13% 6.19% 8.25% 10.32% 12.38% 
40 4.72% 7.07% 9.43% 11.79% 14.15% 
45 5.31% 7.96% 10.61% 13.26% 15.92% 
50 5.89% 8.84% 11.79% 14.74% 17.68% 
55 6.48% 9.73% 12.97% 16.21% 19.45% 
60 7.07% 10.61% 14.15% 17.68% 21.22% 
65 7.66% 11.49% 15.33% 19.16% 22.99% 
70 8.25% 12.38% 16.51% 20.63% 24.76% 
75 8.84% 13.26% 17.68% 22.11% 26.53% 
80 9.43% 14.15% 18.86% 23.58% 28.29% 
85 10.02% 15.03% 20.04% 25.05% 30.06% 
90 10.61% 15.92% 21.22% 26.53% 31.83% 
95 11.20% 16.80% 22.40% 28.00% 33.60% 
100 11.79% 17.68% 23.58% 29.47% 35.37% 
105 12.38% 18.57% 24.76% 30.95% 37.14% 
110 12.97% 19.45% 25.94% 32.42% 38.91% 
115 13.56% 20.34% 27.12% 33.90% 40.67% 
120 14.15% 21.22% 28.29% 35.37% 42.44% 
125 14.74% 22.11% 29.47% 36.84% 44.21% 
130 15.33% 22.99% 30.65% 38.32% 45.98% 
135 15.92% 23.87% 31.83% 39.79% 47.75% 
140 16.51% 24.76% 33.01% 41.26% 49.52% 
145 17.09% 25.64% 34.19% 42.74% 51.28% 








Loan Losses by Scenario 
 
Unscaled Bank Losses – 0% Recovery  
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 320 317 427 578 734 
$10.00 508 570 826 1,136 1,439 
$15.00 658 812 1,223 1,686 2,124 
$20.00 791 1,053 1,619 2,228 2,793 
$25.00 916 1,295 2,015 2,764 3,448 
$30.00 1,034 1,538 2,411 3,294 4,091 
$35.00 1,150 1,784 2,807 3,819 4,723 
$40.00 1,264 2,032 3,202 4,339 5,346 
$45.00 1,376 2,282 3,598 4,855 5,960 
$50.00 1,489 2,534 3,993 5,367 6,565 
$55.00 1,601 2,789 4,387 5,874 7,164 
$60.00 1,713 3,046 4,782 6,377 7,755 
$65.00 1,827 3,305 5,175 6,877 8,339 
$70.00 1,941 3,566 5,568 7,373 8,916 
$75.00 2,056 3,829 5,960 7,865 9,487 
$80.00 2,172 4,094 6,352 8,354 10,052 
$85.00 2,289 4,360 6,742 8,840 10,611 
$90.00 2,408 4,628 7,132 9,322 11,165 
$95.00 2,529 4,897 7,521 9,800 11,712 
$100.00 2,651 5,168 7,908 10,276 12,254 
$105.00 2,774 5,440 8,295 10,748 12,791 
$110.00 2,899 5,713 8,681 11,217 13,323 
$115.00 3,026 5,987 9,065 11,682 13,849 
$120.00 3,155 6,263 9,449 12,145 14,370 
$125.00 3,285 6,539 9,831 12,604 14,886 
$130.00 3,417 6,815 10,211 13,060 15,398 
$135.00 3,551 7,093 10,591 13,513 15,905 
$140.00 3,687 7,371 10,969 13,963 16,407 
$145.00 3,825 7,649 11,346 14,410 16,904 




Scaled Bank Losses (Commercial and Industrial) – 0% Recovery  
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 759 753 1,013 1,371 1,741 
$10.00 1,204 1,351 1,959 2,694 3,413 
$15.00 1,560 1,926 2,900 3,997 5,037 
$20.00 1,876 2,497 3,839 5,282 6,622 
$25.00 2,171 3,070 4,778 6,553 8,175 
$30.00 2,452 3,647 5,716 7,810 9,699 
$35.00 2,727 4,229 6,655 9,055 11,198 
$40.00 2,996 4,817 7,593 10,289 12,674 
$45.00 3,263 5,410 8,530 11,511 14,130 
$50.00 3,529 6,009 9,467 12,724 15,566 
$55.00 3,796 6,613 10,402 13,927 16,985 
$60.00 4,062 7,222 11,337 15,120 18,386 
$65.00 4,331 7,837 12,270 16,305 19,771 
$70.00 4,601 8,455 13,201 17,481 21,140 
$75.00 4,874 9,079 14,131 18,648 22,494 
$80.00 5,150 9,706 15,059 19,808 23,834 
$85.00 5,428 10,338 15,985 20,959 25,159 
$90.00 5,710 10,973 16,909 22,102 26,471 
$95.00 5,996 11,612 17,831 23,237 27,769 
$100.00 6,285 12,254 18,750 24,364 29,055 
$105.00 6,577 12,898 19,667 25,483 30,327 
$110.00 6,874 13,546 20,582 26,595 31,587 
$115.00 7,175 14,196 21,493 27,699 32,835 
$120.00 7,480 14,848 22,402 28,795 34,071 
$125.00 7,789 15,503 23,308 29,884 35,295 
$130.00 8,103 16,159 24,211 30,966 36,508 
$135.00 8,420 16,817 25,111 32,040 37,709 
$140.00 8,742 17,476 26,008 33,106 38,900 
$145.00 9,068 18,137 26,901 34,166 40,079 






Scaled Bank Losses (Commercial, Industrial and Industrial Real Estate) – 0% Recovery  
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 1,477 1,465 1,971 2,668 3,389 
$10.00 2,344 2,629 3,814 5,243 6,642 
$15.00 3,037 3,748 5,644 7,778 9,803 
$20.00 3,652 4,860 7,471 10,281 12,888 
$25.00 4,225 5,975 9,298 12,754 15,910 
$30.00 4,773 7,098 11,125 15,201 18,876 
$35.00 5,307 8,231 12,952 17,624 21,794 
$40.00 5,832 9,375 14,778 20,025 24,668 
$45.00 6,351 10,530 16,602 22,404 27,501 
$50.00 6,869 11,695 18,425 24,764 30,296 
$55.00 7,387 12,871 20,246 27,105 33,057 
$60.00 7,907 14,057 22,065 29,428 35,784 
$65.00 8,429 15,252 23,881 31,734 38,479 
$70.00 8,955 16,457 25,694 34,023 41,144 
$75.00 9,486 17,670 27,503 36,295 43,780 
$80.00 10,023 18,891 29,309 38,551 46,387 
$85.00 10,565 20,120 31,112 40,791 48,967 
$90.00 11,113 21,357 32,910 43,016 51,520 
$95.00 11,669 22,600 34,704 45,225 54,047 
$100.00 12,231 23,849 36,493 47,418 56,548 
$105.00 12,802 25,104 38,278 49,597 59,025 
$110.00 13,379 26,364 40,057 51,761 61,478 
$115.00 13,965 27,629 41,832 53,909 63,906 
$120.00 14,558 28,899 43,601 56,043 66,312 
$125.00 15,160 30,172 45,364 58,163 68,694 
$130.00 15,770 31,450 47,121 60,268 71,054 
$135.00 16,388 32,730 48,873 62,358 73,393 
$140.00 17,014 34,013 50,618 64,434 75,709 
$145.00 17,649 35,299 52,357 66,496 78,004 





Unscaled Bank Losses – 69% Recovery  
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 99 98 132 179 228 
$10.00 157 177 256 352 446 
$15.00 204 252 379 523 659 
$20.00 245 326 502 691 866 
$25.00 284 401 625 857 1,069 
$30.00 321 477 747 1,021 1,268 
$35.00 357 553 870 1,184 1,464 
$40.00 392 630 993 1,345 1,657 
$45.00 427 707 1,115 1,505 1,847 
$50.00 461 786 1,238 1,664 2,035 
$55.00 496 865 1,360 1,821 2,221 
$60.00 531 944 1,482 1,977 2,404 
$65.00 566 1,025 1,604 2,132 2,585 
$70.00 602 1,106 1,726 2,286 2,764 
$75.00 637 1,187 1,848 2,438 2,941 
$80.00 673 1,269 1,969 2,590 3,116 
$85.00 710 1,352 2,090 2,740 3,290 
$90.00 747 1,435 2,211 2,890 3,461 
$95.00 784 1,518 2,331 3,038 3,631 
$100.00 822 1,602 2,452 3,186 3,799 
$105.00 860 1,686 2,571 3,332 3,965 
$110.00 899 1,771 2,691 3,477 4,130 
$115.00 938 1,856 2,810 3,622 4,293 
$120.00 978 1,941 2,929 3,765 4,455 
$125.00 1,018 2,027 3,047 3,907 4,615 
$130.00 1,059 2,113 3,166 4,049 4,773 
$135.00 1,101 2,199 3,283 4,189 4,930 
$140.00 1,143 2,285 3,400 4,329 5,086 
$145.00 1,186 2,371 3,517 4,467 5,240 






Scaled Bank Losses (Commercial and Industrial) – 69% Recovery  
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 235 233 314 425 540 
$10.00 373 419 607 835 1,058 
$15.00 484 597 899 1,239 1,561 
$20.00 582 774 1,190 1,637 2,053 
$25.00 673 952 1,481 2,031 2,534 
$30.00 760 1,131 1,772 2,421 3,007 
$35.00 845 1,311 2,063 2,807 3,471 
$40.00 929 1,493 2,354 3,189 3,929 
$45.00 1,012 1,677 2,644 3,569 4,380 
$50.00 1,094 1,863 2,935 3,944 4,826 
$55.00 1,177 2,050 3,225 4,317 5,265 
$60.00 1,259 2,239 3,514 4,687 5,700 
$65.00 1,343 2,429 3,804 5,055 6,129 
$70.00 1,426 2,621 4,092 5,419 6,553 
$75.00 1,511 2,814 4,381 5,781 6,973 
$80.00 1,596 3,009 4,668 6,140 7,388 
$85.00 1,683 3,205 4,955 6,497 7,799 
$90.00 1,770 3,402 5,242 6,851 8,206 
$95.00 1,859 3,600 5,528 7,203 8,609 
$100.00 1,948 3,799 5,813 7,553 9,007 
$105.00 2,039 3,999 6,097 7,900 9,401 
$110.00 2,131 4,199 6,380 8,244 9,792 
$115.00 2,224 4,401 6,663 8,587 10,179 
$120.00 2,319 4,603 6,945 8,927 10,562 
$125.00 2,415 4,806 7,226 9,264 10,942 
$130.00 2,512 5,009 7,505 9,599 11,317 
$135.00 2,610 5,213 7,784 9,932 11,690 
$140.00 2,710 5,418 8,062 10,263 12,059 
$145.00 2,811 5,622 8,339 10,591 12,424 






Scaled Bank Losses (Commercial, Industrial and Industrial Real Estate) – 69% Recovery 
($MM) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 458 454 611 827 1,051 
$10.00 727 815 1,182 1,625 2,059 
$15.00 941 1,162 1,749 2,411 3,039 
$20.00 1,132 1,507 2,316 3,187 3,995 
$25.00 1,310 1,852 2,882 3,954 4,932 
$30.00 1,480 2,200 3,449 4,712 5,852 
$35.00 1,645 2,552 4,015 5,463 6,756 
$40.00 1,808 2,906 4,581 6,208 7,647 
$45.00 1,969 3,264 5,147 6,945 8,525 
$50.00 2,129 3,625 5,712 7,677 9,392 
$55.00 2,290 3,990 6,276 8,403 10,248 
$60.00 2,451 4,358 6,840 9,123 11,093 
$65.00 2,613 4,728 7,403 9,838 11,929 
$70.00 2,776 5,102 7,965 10,547 12,755 
$75.00 2,941 5,478 8,526 11,251 13,572 
$80.00 3,107 5,856 9,086 11,951 14,380 
$85.00 3,275 6,237 9,645 12,645 15,180 
$90.00 3,445 6,621 10,202 13,335 15,971 
$95.00 3,617 7,006 10,758 14,020 16,754 
$100.00 3,792 7,393 11,313 14,700 17,530 
$105.00 3,968 7,782 11,866 15,375 18,298 
$110.00 4,148 8,173 12,418 16,046 19,058 
$115.00 4,329 8,565 12,968 16,712 19,811 
$120.00 4,513 8,959 13,516 17,373 20,557 
$125.00 4,700 9,353 14,063 18,030 21,295 
$130.00 4,889 9,749 14,608 18,683 22,027 
$135.00 5,080 10,146 15,151 19,331 22,752 
$140.00 5,274 10,544 15,692 19,975 23,470 
$145.00 5,471 10,943 16,231 20,614 24,181 







Losses by Financial Institution 
Derivation of Institution Loan Losses 














JP Morgan 681.39 163,590.56 649,583.00 76.08% 494,201.04 2,058.46 
Bank of America 601.83 153,507.41 499,335.00 88.36% 441,232.60 1,729.86 
Citibank 528.97 108,972.48 387,044.00 48.90% 189,271.17 918.75 
Wells Fargo & 
Co 270.66 104,804.13 347,064.00 100.00% 347,064.00 896.30 
US Bancorp 262.98 56,328.65 131,343.00 100.00% 131,343.00 613.20 
Comerica Bank 63.32 5,115.85 44,185.00 100.00% 44,185.00 546.91 
PNC Bank NA 147.82 51,178.51 167,203.00 100.00% 167,203.00 482.92 
Truist 171.15 62,773.03 170,189.00 100.00% 170,189.00 464.03 
KeyBank 127.80 20,851.07 69,993.00 100.00% 69,993.00 428.99 
Compass Bank 38.59 5,615.59 40,170.40 100.00% 40,170.40 276.06 
Goldman Sachs 
& Co 685.21 107,356.65 64,050.00 61.73% 39,539.66 252.36 
Regions Bank 50.62 11,907.12 53,669.00 100.00% 53,669.00 228.16 
Huntington Bank 19.53 4,922.03 41,537.00 100.00% 41,537.00 164.80 
Fifth Third Bank 96.65 42,173.28 63,182.00 100.00% 63,182.00 144.79 
Capital One 
Bank 18.69 17,302.18 75,780.00 100.00% 75,780.00 81.85 
Northern Trust 31.21 6,058.26 15,262.00 71.52% 10,915.15 56.24 
Morgan Stanley 
Bank NA 1.94 5,182.07 103,351.00 72.65% 75,086.97 28.18 
Bank of New 
York Mellon 11.18 4,837.29 18,730.00 63.12% 11,822.36 27.31 
Ally Commercial 







Python Code for Calculating Probabilities of Default 
 
#Import statements 




from scipy.stats import norm 
from scipy import optimize 
from sympy.solvers import solve 
from sympy import Symbol 
from sympy import log as sympyLog 
 
#Sets up database access 
db = sqlite3.connect("thesis.sqlite") 
db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row 
cursor = db.cursor() 
 
#Assigns average yearly emissions taxbase. First, checks CDP data to see if 
company is included. If not, assigns emissions based on closesest SIC 
industry average 
def getEmissions(SICCode, ticker, revenue, individualMarketCap): 
     
    #Sets variables 
    majorCount = 0 
    majorEmissions = 0 
    industryCount = 0 
    industryEmissions = 0 
     
    #Checks if company is in CDP data 
    query = """SELECT AVG(D.Scope1Emissions) 
                FROM CDPAccountInfoV2 AI, CDPDataV2 D 
                WHERE D.AccountNumber = AI.AccountNumber AND AI.Ticker = 
"""+"\""+ticker+"\""+""" AND CAST(D.Scope1Emissions AS INTEGER) >= 0 AND 
AI.Country = "United States of America" """ 
    cursor.execute(query) 
     
    companyEmissions = cursor.fetchall() 
     
    #Returns emissions of company is in CDP data 
    if companyEmissions[0][0]!= None: 
        print("actual emissions") 
        print(SICCode) 
        return companyEmissions[0][0] 
         
    #Gets the emissions data for all industries that are in the same SIC 
major group (meaning that the first two digits of the SIC code match) 
    SICCode2="\""+str(SICCode)[0:2]+"%\"" 
    query = """SELECT AI.Industry, avg(D.Scope1Emissions)/avg(AI.Revenue) as 
CO2ePerRevDollar 
                    FROM CDPAccountInfoV2 AI, CDPDataV2 D 
                    WHERE AI.AccountNumber = D.AccountNumber AND AI.Industry 
<> "(Invalid Identifier)" AND AI.Revenue <> "(Invalid Identifier)" AND 





                    GROUP BY AI.Industry 
                    ORDER BY CO2ePerRevDollar DESC""" 
    cursor.execute(query) 
    emissionsPerDollar = cursor.fetchall() 
     
    #returns 0 if there is no CDP data on the major SIC group 
    if len(emissionsPerDollar) == 0: 
         
        print("no match") 
        print(SICCode) 
        return -1 
    for row in emissionsPerDollar: 
        SicCode = str(row[0]) 
        #returns emissions if there is data on the exact 4-digit SIC code 
        if int(SicCode) == int(SICCode): 
            print("actual industry") 
            return row[1]*revenue 
        #If there is not data on the exact SIC code, proceeds to calculate 
industry/major average 
        if SicCode[0:3] == str(SICCode)[0:3]: 
            industryCount+=1 
            industryEmissions+=row[1] 
            continue 
        majorCount+=1 
        majorEmissions+=row[1] 
     
    #returns emissions if there is data on the 3-digit SIC industry 
    if industryCount > 0: 
        print("3 digits") 
        return industryEmissions*revenue/industryCount 
    #returns emissions if there is data on the 2-digit SIC major 
    print("2 digits") 




def mertonSolver(initAssetVolatility, initAssetValue, companyLiabilities, 
riskFreeRate, Time,equityValues,mertonCount, tradingDays, marketCap, 
equityVolatility): 
     
    if mertonCount > 50: 
        print("fail") 
        return -1 
     
    #formulas from Black-Scholes model 
    assetValues = [] 
    for i in equityValues: 
        def equations(AssetValue): 
            d1 = (np.log(AssetValue[0]/companyLiabilities) + 
(riskFreeRate+initAssetVolatility**2/2)*Time)/(initAssetVolatility * 
np.sqrt(Time)) 
            d2 = (np.log(AssetValue[0]/companyLiabilities) + 
(riskFreeRate+initAssetVolatility**2/2)*Time)/(initAssetVolatility * 
np.sqrt(Time)) - initAssetVolatility * np.sqrt(Time) 
            nd1 = norm.cdf(d1) 




            equityValue0 = AssetValue[0]*nd1 - np.exp(-
riskFreeRate*Time)*companyLiabilities*nd2 
            return abs(i - equityValue0) 
        ans = optimize.root(equations, [initAssetValue]) 
        #print(i+companyLiabilities) 
        #print(ans) 
        if not ans.success: 
            print("failure") 
            print(ans.message) 
            print("") 
            return -1 
        assetValues.append(ans.x[0]) 
         
    assetReturns = [] 
    count = 0 
    for i in assetValues: 
        if count == 0: 
            count +=1 
            continue 
        assetReturns.append(assetValues[count-1]/i) 
        count+=1 
         
    lnAssetReturns = [] 
    count = 0 
     
    for i in assetReturns: 
        lnAssetReturns.append(np.log(float(i))) 
    newAssetVolatility = np.nanstd(lnAssetReturns)*math.sqrt(tradingDays) 
     
    if (abs(newAssetVolatility - initAssetVolatility) < .001): 
 
        #print("new asset Volatility") 
        #print(newAssetVolatility) 
        ans = [newAssetVolatility, assetValues[0]] 
        return ans 
    #print("old asset volatility") 
    #print(initAssetVolatility) 
    #print("new asset volatility") 
    #print(newAssetVolatility) 
    mertonCount +=1 
    return mertonSolver(newAssetVolatility, assetValues[0], 
companyLiabilities, riskFreeRate, Time,equityValues, mertonCount, 




def solvePD(carbonTax, years): 
     
    #array to be returned with results in form [[ticker1, PD1], [ticker2, 
PD2], ... [tickerN, PDN]] 
    results = [] 
     
     
    #arrays that will hold the standard deviation of natural log of returns 
and tickers at the same indexes 
 




    rawMarketCaps = [] 
    lnReturns = [] 
    stdvLnReturns = [] 
    liabilities = [] 
    tickers = [] 
    marketCap = [] 
    borrowerIDs = [] 
    sicCodes = [] 
    revenues = [] 
     
    #number of trading days used to calculate yearly volatility 
    tradingDays = 252 
    riskFreeRate = 0.02 
    Time = 1 
    minimumTradingDays = 40 
     
    with open('lnEquityReturns_v3.csv') as csv_file: 
        #puts tickers in array 
        csv_reader = csv.reader(csv_file, delimiter=',') 
        count = 0 
        for row in csv_reader: 
            if row[0]!="" and count>0: 
                tickers.append(row[1]) 
                 
            count+=1 
             
        #takes input of ln returns for 1 year and ads standard deviation to 
stdvLnReturns. At this point, daily volatility is in stdvLnReturns 
        my_data = np.genfromtxt('lnEquityReturns_v3.csv', delimiter=',') 
        for row in my_data: 
            if not np.isnan(row[3]): 
                rawMarketCaps.append(row[7:-1]) 
                liabilities.append(row[3]) 
                marketCap.append(row[4]) 
                sicCodes.append(row[0]) 
                revenues.append(row[5]) 
                borrowerIDs.append(row[6]) 
                 
         
        #Gets rid of all days without data 
        for row in rawMarketCaps: 
            tempArray = [] 
            for mc in row: 
                if mc !=0: 
                    tempArray.append(mc) 
            nonZeroMarketCaps.append(tempArray) 
             
        #Finds daily ln(returns) 
        for row in nonZeroMarketCaps: 
            tempArray = [] 
            count = 0 
            for mc in row: 
                if count == 0: 
                    count +=1 
                    continue 
                lnRet = np.log(row[count-1]/mc) 




                if lnRet != 0: 
                    tempArray.append(lnRet) 
                count +=1 
            lnReturns.append(tempArray) 
             
       
        # Calculates yearly equity volatility, inputing -1 if there are less 
than minimumTradingDays of usable data 
        for row in lnReturns: 
            if len(row)<minimumTradingDays-1: 
                stdvLnReturns.append(-1) 
                continue 
            stdvLnReturns.append(np.nanstd(row)*math.sqrt(tradingDays)) 
             
    count = 0 
    zeroliabilities= 0 
    for i in stdvLnReturns: 
         
        #Accounts for companies without sufficient data 
        #if count > 4: 
         #   count+=1 
          #  continue 
        if i == -1: 
            count+=1 
            continue 
        volatility = i 
        ticker = tickers[count] 
        revenue = revenues[count] 
        equityValue = marketCap[count] 
        companyLiabilities = liabilities[count]  
        emissions = getEmissions(sicCodes[count], ticker, revenue, 
equityValue) 
        print(ticker) 
         
        if companyLiabilities == 0 or companyLiabilities == np.nan or 
emissions == -1 or revenue == 0: 
            zeroliabilities+=1 
            count+=1 
            continue     
        initAssetValue = equityValue+companyLiabilities 
        initAssetVolatility = equityValue*volatility/initAssetValue 
         
        if initAssetVolatility == np.nan: 
            count+=1 
            continue 
                 
        mertonOutput = mertonSolver(initAssetVolatility, initAssetValue, 
companyLiabilities, riskFreeRate, Time, nonZeroMarketCaps[count], 0, 
tradingDays, equityValue, volatility) 
         
        if mertonOutput == -1: 
            count+=1 
            continue 
         
        assetValue = mertonOutput[1] 
        assetVolatility = mertonOutput[0] 




        for y in years: 
            Time = y 
            for tax in carbonTax: 
                taxLiability = (emissions*tax/1000000)+ 
(emissions*tax/1000000)*(Time-1)/2 
                if Time == 1: 
                    taxLiability = emissions*tax/1000000 
                     
                d1 = (np.log(assetValue/(companyLiabilities+taxLiability)) + 
(secondRiskFreeRate+assetVolatility**2/2)*Time)/(assetVolatility * 
np.sqrt(Time)) 
                 
                d2 = d1 - assetVolatility * np.sqrt(Time) 
                nd1 = norm.cdf(d1) 
                nd2 = norm.cdf(d2) 
         
                result = [ticker,tax, y, 1-nd2, borrowerIDs[count], 
taxLiability, companyLiabilities, sicCodes[count], emissions] 
                results.append(result) 
        count+=1 
    return(results) 
allResults = solvePD([0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 
70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100, 105, 110, 115, 120, 125, 130, 135, 140, 145, 
150], [1,2,3,4,5]) 
 
cursor.execute("""DROP TABLE IF EXISTS preCarbonTaxPDs""") 
cursor.execute("""DROP TABLE IF EXISTS postCarbonTaxPDs""") 
 
cursor.execute(""" 
    CREATE TABLE preCarbonTaxPDs (  
    Ticker String, 
    carbonTax Int, 
    year Int, 
    pd Float, 
    borrowerCompanyID Int, 
    taxLiability Int, 
    Liabilities Int, 
    sicCode Int, 
    emissions Int 
    ) 
""") 
 
for result in allResults: 
    cursor.execute("""INSERT INTO preCarbonTaxPDs VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 
?,?, ?)""", (result[0], result[1], result[2], result[3], result[4], 









Derivation of Black Scholes Option Pricing 
The Black Scholes option pricing model is a formula for calculating the price of 
European all options. European call options are contracts that give holders the options to buy an 
equity at a fixed price (strike price) on a fixed date (exercise date). The general intuition for this 
model is that such an option should be worth the difference between the share price on the 
exercise date and the strike price, discounted back to the present. Because the Black Scholes 
model assumes a risk-free world (meaning that all stocks should grow at the risk-free rate), if all 
stocks grow at the same rate, the price of the call option should be represented by Formula 1, 
where c is the price of the call option, S0 is the current stock price, r is the risk-free rate, t is the 
time before the exercise date, and k is the strike price. In this model, where all equities grow at 
the same rate, the price of the option is the maximum of zero and difference between the stock 
price and discounted strike price. 
Formula 1 
𝑐 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥((𝑆0𝑒
𝑟𝑡 − 𝑘)𝑒−𝑟𝑡, 0) 
 
Formula 1 can then be simplified as shown in Formula 2.  
 
Formula 2 
𝑐 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑆0 − 𝑘𝑒
−𝑟𝑡, 0) 
 
However, not all equities grow at the same rate, and Formula 2 can be modified to 
include the possibility some equity values grow at a rate different than the risk-free rate. By 




holder will pay the strike price or what the equity value will be on the exercise date. Therefore, 
one must weight ke-rt (the discounted strike price) by the probability that the option will be 
exercised, and one must weight S0 (how much the investor expects to get from selling the stock 
after exercising the option) by the probability that the option is worth less than zero, assuming 
returns follow a normal distribution. The probability that the option will be exercised (i.e., the 
probability that the stock will be higher than the strike price) is equal to the cumulative normal 
function of d2, as described in Formula 4, and the probability the amount the investor expects to 
get from selling the call option is equal to the cumulative normal function of d1, as described in 
Formula 5. In both these equations, 𝜎 is equal to equity volatility. 
 
Formula 3 
















Putting Formulas 3 and 4 together with Formula 2, one can derive that the price of a 
European call option is equal to Formula 5. 
 
Formula 5 
𝑐 = 𝑆0 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑘𝑒






Relative Loan Losses 
 
Commercial, Industrial, and Commercial Real Estate Bank Losses as a Percentage of 2020 CCAR 
Losses – 0% Recovery  
(%) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 0.32 0.32 0.43 0.58 0.74 
$10.00 0.51 0.57 0.83 1.15 1.45 
$15.00 0.66 0.82 1.23 1.70 2.14 
$20.00 0.80 1.06 1.63 2.25 2.82 
$25.00 0.92 1.31 2.03 2.79 3.48 
$30.00 1.04 1.55 2.43 3.32 4.12 
$35.00 1.16 1.80 2.83 3.85 4.76 
$40.00 1.27 2.05 3.23 4.37 5.39 
$45.00 1.39 2.30 3.63 4.89 6.01 
$50.00 1.50 2.55 4.02 5.41 6.62 
$55.00 1.61 2.81 4.42 5.92 7.22 
$60.00 1.73 3.07 4.82 6.43 7.82 
$65.00 1.84 3.33 5.22 6.93 8.41 
$70.00 1.96 3.59 5.61 7.43 8.99 
$75.00 2.07 3.86 6.01 7.93 9.56 
$80.00 2.19 4.13 6.40 8.42 10.13 
$85.00 2.31 4.39 6.80 8.91 10.70 
$90.00 2.43 4.66 7.19 9.40 11.25 
$95.00 2.55 4.94 7.58 9.88 11.81 
$100.00 2.67 5.21 7.97 10.36 12.35 
$105.00 2.80 5.48 8.36 10.83 12.89 
$110.00 2.92 5.76 8.75 11.31 13.43 
$115.00 3.05 6.04 9.14 11.78 13.96 
$120.00 3.18 6.31 9.52 12.24 14.48 
$125.00 3.31 6.59 9.91 12.70 15.01 
$130.00 3.44 6.87 10.29 13.16 15.52 
$135.00 3.58 7.15 10.68 13.62 16.03 
$140.00 3.72 7.43 11.06 14.07 16.54 
$145.00 3.86 7.71 11.44 14.52 17.04 






Minimum CET1 Ratio Under 2020 CCAR Severely Adverse Scenario with Climate Losses  
– 0% Recovery, Scaled to Commercial, Industrial, and Commercial Real Estate  
(%) 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 
$5.00 9.59 9.59 9.59 9.58 9.58 
$10.00 9.59 9.59 9.58 9.57 9.56 
$15.00 9.58 9.58 9.57 9.56 9.54 
$20.00 9.58 9.57 9.56 9.54 9.53 
$25.00 9.58 9.57 9.55 9.53 9.51 
$30.00 9.57 9.56 9.54 9.51 9.49 
$35.00 9.57 9.55 9.53 9.50 9.48 
$40.00 9.57 9.55 9.52 9.49 9.46 
$45.00 9.56 9.54 9.51 9.47 9.44 
$50.00 9.56 9.53 9.50 9.46 9.43 
$55.00 9.56 9.53 9.49 9.45 9.41 
$60.00 9.56 9.52 9.47 9.43 9.40 
$65.00 9.55 9.51 9.46 9.42 9.38 
$70.00 9.55 9.51 9.45 9.41 9.37 
$75.00 9.55 9.50 9.44 9.39 9.35 
$80.00 9.54 9.49 9.43 9.38 9.34 
$85.00 9.54 9.49 9.42 9.37 9.32 
$90.00 9.54 9.48 9.41 9.36 9.31 
$95.00 9.53 9.47 9.40 9.34 9.29 
$100.00 9.53 9.46 9.39 9.33 9.28 
$105.00 9.53 9.46 9.38 9.32 9.26 
$110.00 9.52 9.45 9.37 9.31 9.25 
$115.00 9.52 9.44 9.36 9.29 9.24 
$120.00 9.52 9.44 9.35 9.28 9.22 
$125.00 9.51 9.43 9.34 9.27 9.21 
$130.00 9.51 9.42 9.33 9.26 9.20 
$135.00 9.51 9.41 9.32 9.25 9.18 
$140.00 9.50 9.41 9.31 9.23 9.17 
$145.00 9.50 9.40 9.30 9.22 9.16 
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